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# West Europe Report

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ARMS CONTROL

BELGIUM

# FLANDERS, WALLONIA DIFFER ON CRUISE MISSILES

Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 31 Dec 84 pp 84-85

[Text] The resistance is housed in a cabinetmaker's tiny shop on the lower end of the street not far from the city hall. There, Benoit Van Den Heeden, a 22-year-old conscientious objecter, makes pine furniture in the Scandinavian design popular among young people.

The cabinetmaking business is doing well. But Van Den Heeden is having trouble selling what really concerns him. The young cabinetmaker is working for the "Campaign to Save Florennes," made up of a handful of Wallonian pacifists who have joined in opposing the NATO arms buildup in Belgium.

According to the NATO timetable, in three months Belgium is to begin assuming its share of the arms buildup decided on in 1979. This provides for 48 American cruise missiles to be deployed at the military air base at Florennes, 70 miles south of Brussels.

Among the town's 4,100 inhabitants, there are, estimates the local chief of police, only 9 or 10 who actually oppose the missiles. Says he: "We know all of them, and they are harmless." Benoit Van Den Heeden admits that he and his friends are having problems: "The people unwilling to listen to us because the Americans are corrupting them with their dollars."

For years Florennes has been suffering from the economic crisis that has struck mainly the old industrial areas in the southern part of Belgium known as Wallonia. Thousands have lost their jobs in the coal mines and steel mills in nearby Charleroi. The number of unemployed in the region is running about 20 percent--enormous even for conditions in Belgium.

The businesses in Florennes are feeling the decline in purchasing power. As new customers, the Americans are just what they need. Almost 800 of them are already living in Florennes in order to prepare for the deployment. When the nuclear weapons arrive, there are to be 1,500 American soldiers. The municipality intends to build 650 new apartments for them.

The U.S. Military, says Mayor Louis Timmermanns, has already hired 200 Belgian nationals and will need more later--drivers, cooks, translators, cleaning women.



When the first Americans arrived, they immediately opened an information office and distributed application forms. "People were standing in line and 1,500 forms were handed out in 2 days," exclaimed Francis Evard, who as manager of the savings bank there is hoping for a brisk business in exchanging dollars.

The small U.S. contingent under the command of Col Reed was psychologically trained specifically for duty in Belgium. The soldiers--for the most part highly trained technicians--are learning French in special courses, playing basketball and ping pong with the sports clubs in the area, and one of them plays the trombone in the Florennes music group.

"They are behaving themselves and spending money," observes the mayor. "What else could you ask for?"

There are historical reasons, too, for the popularity of the Americans among the Wallonians. No one in Florennes has forgotten September 3, 1944--the day the American troops liberated the city from the Germans.

Before it retreated, the German army set fires in the town. The airport where the missiles are to be placed was built for the German air force in 1943 with the labor of impressed Belgians.

In the winter of 1944-45, the GIs again stopped Hitler's divisions as they re-invaded southern Belgium in their Ardennes offensive. During the past several weeks, the Wallonian villages everywhere between the Meuse and the German border commemorated their American defenders, who at the time suffered nearly 10,000 casualties in Belgium.

Such memories combined with the hope for a local economic boom leave no chance for the peace movement in Florennes. Belgium's pacifists are at home in the northern part of the country--in Flanders.

There, the military has never been especially popular. Until the 1950s, the majority of the recruits for Belgium's army were sons of Flemish farmers, whereas as many as two-thirds of the officers under whose command they fought came from the French-speaking parts of the country.

Very wisely, the government in Brussels never seriously entertained the idea of deploying the missiles at a Flemish base. The Flemish, whom the French-speaking Wallonians like to characterize as having a penchant for mysticism, are fascinated by the successes of the peace movement in the Netherlands. No Flemish party, not even the inflexibly right-wing People's Union, will seriously come out in favor of the nuclear weapons on Belgian soil.

The dislike of the Flemish for the cruise missiles has now caused embarrassment for Prime Minister Wilfried Martens and his Foreign Minister, Leo Tindemans--both Flemish Christian Democrats. Although the NATO blueprint calls for the Belgian Government to begin the buildup in

March 1985, the CVP [Christian People's Party] is insisting on postponement. Luc Van Den Brande, CVP party whip in the parliament in Brussels, warns that his delegates will force early elections if the government deploys in March.

And party boss Frank Swaelen wants to wait and see what happens in the U.S.-Soviet talks scheduled to resume in Geneva in January.

Swaelen's speeches brought him an invitation for breakfast with U.S. Ambassador Geoffrey Swaebe. On the following day he was asked to dine with Bonn's representative, Christian Feit. In vain the two diplomats appealed to the Belgian politician's feeling for the solidarity of the alliance. The governments in Bonn and Washington fear that the Dutch, already wavering as it is, will declare a flat refusal if Belgium delays deployment.

The reason for the Christian Democrat's hesitancy is easy to understand: Swaelen fears a voter backlash in the parliamentary election in December 1985 if the government allows deployment before then. Already in the European election last June the Christian Democrats--traditionally the strongest party in Flanders--were hard pressed by the Social Democrats, who for their part have taken a position against accepting the nuclear missiles.

Martens and Tindemans do not plan to make their final decision until March, just before the scheduled start of the buildup. In mid-January Belgium's two top politicians plan to travel to Washington to see U.S. President Ronald Reagan and solicit understanding for their problem. But George Schultz has already cut off their retreat. At the December NATO meeting in Brussels, the U.S. secretary of state said that a Belgian moratorium would weaken the U.S. negotiating position at Geneva.

The missile dispute is giving the Flemish and the Wallonians another opportunity to pursue their favorite pastime--making malicious remarks about the ethnic character of the other linguistic group.

The Flemish claim in all seriousness that the Wallonians are not opposing the missiles simply because they are by nature lethargic. The Wallonians, on the other hand, attribute the success of the peace movement in Flanders to the "innate irrationalism" of the Flemish.

And Timmermanns, the mayor of Florennes, thinks that his compatriots in the north are notorious hypocrites. Last year, he says, the Flemish streamed into Florennes by the thousands to demonstrate and form human chains, and now Flemish contractors are secretly bidding for contracts to build bunkers and silos for the missiles.

The U.S. officers, long accustomed to experiencing invectives and demonstrations in Europe, were quite touched when they came to Florennes. An amazed Col Reed told Mayor Timmermanns that he had never been so warmly welcomed anywhere else before.



POLITICAL

CYPRUS

PRAVDA CORRESPONDENT ON CYPRUS PROBLEM

NC161909 Athens RIZOSPATIS in Greek 16 Jan 85 p 3

["Text" of interview with PRAVDA correspondent Vitaliy Menshikov by RIZOSPASTIS correspondent Y. Litsos in Moscow--date not given]

[Text] Litsos: So far the United States and NATO have not fully succeeded in their goals. How can you explain this?

Menshikov: The abolition of Cyprus' independence was truly the imperialists' goal, something that they failed to do despite the fact that the island was substantially divided in 1974. This, to a great extent, is due to the fact that the Cypriots' struggle has the support of the USSR, the other socialist countries, the world's progressive forces, and that of the nonaligned movement.

Litsos: Even some people of good faith have expressed doubt as to whether the United Nations could, ultimately, help in finding a just solution. What do you say about this?

Menshikov: The latest developments on the Cyprus issue contradict these allegations. The United Nations in these difficult conditions showed that it can contribute in lifting the deadlock on the Cyprus issue. The UN secretary general's good offices, which are supported by the overwhelming majority of the UN member states, open prospects for finding a mutually acceptable solution. Naturally the convening of an international conference under UN auspices--as the USSR had proposed--could considerably contribute toward achieving progress on the Cyprus issue. It is not just incidental that now the USSR strongly supports the UN secretary general's good offices.

Litsos: For many years the Turkish Cypriot leaders, with Turkey's and U.S.-NATO imperialist support, have been observing an intransigent stand. What do you have to say on this?

Menshikov: In principle we cannot say now what concessions the Turkish Cypriot side will make. There is no completed document on this issue yet.

With regard to the fact that the Turkish Cypriot side will set at the table for talks, I must say that this is what all progressive people, and the

overwhelming majority of the UN member states want. The Turkish Cypriot leaders were completely isolated. Because there was no solution to the Cyprus issue, the result was that many economic problems of the Turkish Cypriot community were not resolved. It substantively stopped their prosperity.

Litsos: Can one believe that the Cyprus issue will be solved if the foreign military forces and foreign troops remain on the island?

Menshikov: I have previously underlined that the foreign military presence in Cyprus is precisely one of the basic reasons preventing a just settlement of the issue. It is very clear that the continuation of this presence does not contribute solving the Cyprus issue.

Litsos: How do you appraise in the USSR the Kiprianou-Denktas meeting, and what are the predictions on this meeting?

Menshikov: It is very difficult for one to predict the outcome of this meeting. Part of the western press make various pessimistic forecasts. However, the fact that such a summit meeting will be held under the UN auspices, and the fact that the framework of a possible agreement is apparent, must make us particularly optimistic about the outcome of the meeting.

CSO: 3521/168

POLITICAL

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

## FDP PRE-ELECTION STATUS ASSESSED

### Survey Suggests Survival Possible

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 31 Dec 84 p 4

[Article by hls. datelined Bonn 30 Dec 84: "'Not Without a Chance' in the Land Elections"]

[Text] Unpublished demographic data which are available to the FDP general secretary provide a ray of hope for the Liberals. The Institute for Practice-Oriented Social Research (IPOS), part of the research group for elections in Mannheim, conducted 1,000 interviews in each of the regions and found out that the FDP has a chance of taking the 5-percent hurdle in the upcoming Landtag elections in North-Rhine Westphalia on 16 May and also in the Saarland and in Berlin on 10 March. In the Saarland, October opinion polls by IPOS yielded the following results: CDU 43.9 percent, SPD 43.4 percent, FDP 5.1 percent, Greens 6.6 percent, others 1.0 percent. For Berlin the results were as follows, also in October: CDU 44.6 percent, SPD 38.9 percent, FDP 4.9 percent, Greens 10 percent, others 1.5 percent. For North-Rhine-Westphalia, interviews were conducted as early as August when the crisis surrounding Moellemann had not yet been settled. Since then, following the appointment of former President Rohde as leading candidate, the FDP is expecting even more favorable results than was the case in August: SPD 43.9 percent, CDU 42.2 percent, FDP 5 percent, Greens 7.5 percent, others 1.4 percent.

As far as the FDP and its declared coalition partner, the CDU, are concerned, what matters now is the ability to translate the mood portrayed in opinion polls into votes. The majority of CDU supporters accept the FDP as a coalition partner, because it improves substantially the "competence" of a government headed by the CDU, particularly when it comes to the most important economic problems of the respective states. Furthermore, a majority of those questioned felt that it would be a good thing if the FDP were to return to the Landtage. In Berlin, for instance, it could have an effect on the election, because of its two-vote system. According to the IPOS results as well as other indications, it seems unlikely that one of the major parties will get an absolute majority of seats. As a result, it is important for the FDP in these three federal states that its coalition intention is supported by the followers and voters of the CDU and of the FDP.

For the Saarland IPOS predicts that the race between the CDU and the FDP on one hand and the SPD and the Greens on the other hand will end in "a dead heat." According to the "image" depicted in Bonn by President Zeyer (CDU) and his Social Democratic challenger Lafontaine, Zeyer's lead over Lafontaine comes as a surprise: He is leading by 10 percent. Saarland's Minister of Economics Rehberger, who has only been in office for a short time, "agrees with the highly positive opinion that was represented by Werner Klumpp at an earlier time in favor of the FDP in the Saarland. A government under the leadership of Zeyer and Rehberger seems to enjoy greater confidence when it comes to the solution of the most important problems of the Saar--the structural question of the steel industry and the preservation of the jobs--than an SPD government headed by Lafontaine with or without the participation of the Greens.

In Berlin, according to the opinion poll results, the coalition government of the CDU and FDP has a better starting position. Diepgen, the acting mayor, is ahead of Apel by 7 percent, and as a Berliner he also has an effect on the followers of the SPD. In contrast to the Saarland and to North-Rhine-Westphalia, voters in Berlin switch a lot, moving back and forth between the CDU and the SPD. Diepgen can count more heavily on the followers of the CDU and the FDP than Apel can count on the supporters of the SPD. According to the opinion polls, a Senate led by the CDU/FDP enjoys greater confidence than a Senate led by the SPD when it comes to solving the important questions of preserving jobs and reducing harmful substances in the air and in water. The majority of those questioned in Berlin are not satisfied with the results that have been achieved to date in negotiations with the GDR.

#### Campaign Techniques, Policies Profiled

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 3 Jan 85 p 8

[Article by Claus Gennrich datelined Bonn 2 Jan 85: "Rapid Strokes by the FDP--How the Liberals Intend to Remind Voters They're Around"]

[Text] The FDP will start its campaign for the spring Landtag elections at the beginning of January. After all, what is at stake is the continuing participation by the FDP in the governments of the Saarland and of Berlin, the only two states that remained for the FDP; they are to be defended. Furthermore, the FDP is dreaming of returning to the Duesseldorf Landtag. Communal elections are scheduled in Hesse. It appears that the FDP is engaged in a losing battle with the Greens for the rank of the third party; in reality, however, the issue is parliamentary survival. Now the starting position will have to be clarified: Who is leading the party? The FDP's Epiphany meeting on 6 January in Stuttgart is supposed to provide the information. Minister of Economics Bangemann--he is to be elected chairman by the party in February--will deliver the main address; he will be followed by Minister of Foreign Affairs Genscher, who has announced his resignation as chairman and who is looking for areas of continuing influence, and finally Haussmann, the FDP general secretary--whose importance in the party has grown of late--is expected

to present a plan of possible cooperation and division of labor between the future party chairman and the minister of foreign affairs. The general secretary already said that Genscher in his capacity as minister of foreign affairs and vice chancellor will remain an important member of the FDP presidium, but from now on Bangemann's influence should also become more pronounced in "central party questions." The FDP presidium should again become "a real leadership organ," in which younger people should also be able to participate in decisions. The implication was that to date it had not been the case.

On the day preceding the Epiphany meeting, the Baden-Wuerttemberg state party convention will choose a successor to the departing state chairman Morlok, presumably Gallus, Bonn's parliamentary state secretary. Haussmann is a candidate for the seat of deputy state chairman. Subsequently the presidium of the federal party will convene in Stuttgart and presumably discuss a strategy toward the Greens. Haussmann prepared a paper which in January is to be distributed to the FDP organizations: aim will be taken at the enemy.

The FDP presidium will not be able to circumvent an unpleasant topic: the party's financial need. It is possible that the discussion will be postponed until a special commission established for this purpose will submit austerity proposals on 25 January. The debates on the newly passed party law and contributions almost put an end to the flow of money into the coffers of the FDP. In 1984 the FDP received barely 150,000 marks in contributions. In 1983 the amount exceeded DM 6 million. Now cuts have to be made because the burden of debts has risen ominously. The federal party will have to "structurally readjust" its expenditures, as it is called. The state associations are to let the federal party know what is dispensable from their vantage points. One item under consideration is a reduction in the size of the membership newspaper. But there is also talk of cuts in personnel. Most likely it would affect the FDP federal business office in Bonn, which has only 25 workers left as it is.

Rapid strokes will be one strategy used by the FDP to remind the voters that they are around. Following the Epiphany meeting will be an FDP federal congress in Karlsruhe on genotechnology, one of Genscher's favorite topics and a topic of the future in the eyes of the FDP. Subsequently, on 9 January, the FDP presidium will convene in Berlin, a place where the party desperately needs to show its colors to counteract the attitude of rejection in the Tiergarten district before the election to the House of Deputies takes place. Finally, the FDP wants to recommend itself to female voters in North-Rhine-Westphalia and elsewhere with a women's congress in Essen. In January the FDP faction will have to make an important staffing decision in Bonn's Bundestag, which will simultaneously be an indication the direction the party is to take. The 35 deputies will have to elect a deputy faction chairman because the businessman Cronenberg advanced to Bundestag vice president. Baum and Hirsch, who are concerned with domestic and judicial policies, would



like to see their own work area represented in the executive committee, in other words, they would like to recommend one of their own members. Candidates representing the "economic wing" are Hesse's Hoffie and the deputies Solms and Neuhausen.

The FDP is creating enough anxiety with the replacement of the chairman and other leading members in the states; so far it has been spared changes in cabinet posts. Criticism of Minister of Justice Engelhard never subsided in the FDP. Right now deliberations are in progress to come up with an FDP politician who will fill the position of vice president of the Bundestag, replacing former Treasurer Wurbs. Attempts have been made to nominate Engelhard, thereby creating a vacancy for his government post. Rumors were circulating in the faction that Baum might hope to become minister of justice. The nomination and election of Cronenberg put an end to the theoretic puzzle play. Since the 1983 Bundestag election, which reduced the size of the FDP faction, there has been less dissension and also there have been fewer occasions of breaking up into groups than was the case at earlier times. Almost every member of the shrunken team has to take part in work groups and committees and as a result there is little time to concoct intrigues to the same degree as was customary at earlier times.

Leading FDP politicians from the states are dissatisfied with the Bundestag faction. They hope that the style of operation in the federal party will improve following the change from Genscher to Bangemann, and they are already mentioning the fact that the new members of the presidium had brought more candor into the leadership circle of the FDP, which until then had been more or less "voiceless." During Genscher's final days people were only watching one another and when they were talking to others they were not even communicating. The Bavarians, for instance, complain that since the change of government the power of Mischnick, the faction chairman, has been paralyzed. The faction is primarily occupied with "unimportant items that have little bearing on important daily events" and there is no desire to shape things. It was unable to combine in its parliamentary work independence and loyalty to the coalition. In the opinion of some young leaders in the FDP, Bangemann--in contrast to Genscher he is not burdened by a long past with the SPD--must make sure that the political changes which in 1982 had come about under the force of practical necessity must now be filled with substance and supportive personnel. It could be extended beyond the next Bundestag election and it must also be applied to the faction. One member of the FDP presidium called the coalition switch of 1982 a power play which is still in need of a program.

FDP deputies like Wolfgramm, the business manager of the faction, object to the criticism from FDP politicians who no longer have a faction in their own state or who are in the opposition. "It is easiest to advocate pure doctrines when one is outside of Parliament or in the opposition." The compromises of the coalition gave the FDP Bundestag faction of the federal party the appearance of a suitable scapegoat, because "the

faction" is the "only visible acting force." But compromises require influence. The condition of the small party clearly shows how different the respective initial positions and starting points look when viewed from "above" and "below," in alliances and when searching for renewal. Mischnick, who is still displaying his skill at negotiations in the coalition and also within the faction, can sometimes feel the displeasure of newcomers to the faction and he tries to include former male and female outsiders. Mischnick does not have a competitor. As a result, it is not likely that some of the state associations will demonstrate satisfaction with the Bundestag faction in the near future.

Minister of Economics Bangemann is not a member of the Bundestag. But he is already taking part in the sessions of the FDP faction on a regular basis. Leading deputies see a danger on the horizon, loyalty conflicts in view of the future and the current chairman. But they are already prepared to take Bangemann seriously as party chairman, even in the Bundestag faction. Already now the deputies credit the minister of economics with a sufficient amount of determination to accomplish things. He demonstrated "that he knows what he wants," when he turned around" Baden-Wuerttemberg's state party convention in the dispute "with Molok" over the low-pollution automobile. The manner in which Bangemann managed to become faction chairman of the Liberals in the European Parliament was proof: "He is carried by a will to power." As a result it is expected that the "leadership question" in the FDP will take care of itself, if Bangemann succeeds in 1985 in "motivating" FDP party workers--most of whom feel very insecure--and later perhaps also the voters. He enjoys enough confidence to be capable of doing it. The FDP presidium is convinced that the result will be a greater distance to Genscher, in spite of the fact that the minister of foreign affairs will remain vice chancellor in contrast to the old practice, according to which the chairman of the smaller coalition party is also charged with being the deputy of the chancellor in the cabinet. Until then it will be difficult to answer some of the questions which the party is asking itself and those that are being put to the voters.

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CSO: 3620/172



POLITICAL

FINLAND

# VAYRYNEN'S CAUTION REGARDING SWEDISH-USSR TIES EXAMINED

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 15 Jan 85 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Magnus Jansson: "Silence Is Gold"]

[Text] Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen has warned our authorities against mentioning the submarine incidents in Sweden and is applauded by SVENSKA DAGBLADET. Jan-Magnus Jansson notes that Vayrynen's statement did not contain any appeal to the mass media but points out that in Finland's security policy Sweden occupies a special position and that it is difficult for the media to comment unless total honesty is involved.

In an interview in HUFVUDSTADSBLADET last Friday, Foreign Minister Paavo Vayrynen called on the authorities in Finland not to take an official stand on the submarine incidents in Sweden. The authorities may have their opinions, but it would be better to refrain from commenting, in particular since our two neighboring countries represent different interpretations of the situation. Vayrynen also notes that "outside the circle of the authorities" judgements have occurred in Finland which were noticed on the Swedish side.

In general, Vayrynen believes, Finland should act restrained and allow Sweden and the Soviet Union to settle the whole thing by themselves. All diplomatic channels are open to them, he stresses.

That restraint is a course which Vayrynen has consistently represented is shown by the fact that he has made a few previous, albeit perhaps not equally distinct, statements in the same vein.

Vayrynen is warmly applauded by the principal organ of the Swedish conservatives, SVENSKA DAGBLADET. The paper notes that he speaks "with a different pitch than several other contributions made on the subject." He is anxious to avoid a schoolmaster attitude, and his position should be respected, SVENSKA DAGBLADET emphasizes. There was surprise in Sweden that the Finnish speculations exhale mistrust in such great measure against the Swedish standpoint. This mistrust concerned both the nature of the incidents and the Swedish Soviet policy as such.

As was pointed out by SVENSKA DAGBLADET, those who made the statements were by no means little boys; even centrally placed persons in Finnish society have uttered unsuitable words. Yes, in certain respects this applies even to "the most central person who exists in Finnish society." The seeds sown during Kovisto's goodwill visit to Stockholm appear at least partially to have fallen on Swedish rock.

Vayrynen is probably right when he says that it is best for authorities in Finland not to comment on controversial matters in the neighboring countries. A fact is, however, that Swedish correspondents, among others, initially accused our authorities of ducking. It is only regrettable that the ties between Finland and Sweden are now considered so sensitive that appeals a la Paasikivi are considered necessary in order to keep them on the right track.

In his statement Vayrynen does not directly mention the attitude of the daily press and of other opinionmakers, and no appeal to the press to keep quiet can be inferred from it. The position of the Finnish newspapers is a little precarious, however. If they are to express any opinions at all on Swedish security policy, they could scarcely avoid speaking of the submarine incidents as well (which may have culminated) or of Sweden's policy in general toward the Soviet Union, both of which are extremely central matters. If the issue is to be hushed up, the demand for what in other contexts is called self-censorship easily enters the picture. And since Finland inevitably must look after its own security interests, it is not obvious that the comment will please all variants of opinion in Sweden, no matter how desirable this was.

Consideration and understanding are always a virtue in sensitive situations, above all toward fraternal countries. But the militant opinion in Sweden has missed one point. Finland is the only country for which Sweden's security is both an affair of the heart and of common sense. Sweden's security is our security, while to almost every other nation Sweden is nothing more than a pawn in the game. But complete honesty is a fundamental requirement in order for the heart and common sense to be allowed to speak.

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POLITICAL

FRANCE

DELORS ON EDUCATING PUBLIC FOR BUSINESS, INDUSTRIAL CHANGE

Paris ESPRIT in French Dec 84 pp 111-124

[Interview with Jacques Delors, former minister of economy, finance, and budget, by Paul Thibaud; date and place not specified]

[Text] Since the latest cabinet reshuffle, Jacques Delors has had extraterritorial status in French politics by reason of the duties he performs in Brussels and also because of a political career (which he in no way repudiates) that has not always remained within the confines of the current majority. If one is seeking a way of talking about politics which does not ignore partisan debates but at the same time does not confine itself to them, he is a valuable reference.

His special position makes J. Delors a politician whose affiliations are of less interest than his practice as a social engineer, as he himself says here. As he describes it, that practice strikes us as interesting for two reasons: because of its pedagogical dimension (how to make people acknowledge reality) and because of its dimension for stimulation and discussion (how to "mobilize" the various groups and involve them in the necessary action). Those are two ways of presenting the politician not as a sovereign, not as a Machiavelli, and not as the master of solutions, but as the one who must stir up, increase, and enlighten collective capabilities.

Not so Easy!

Paul Thibaud: What is your assessment of the economic policy that you carried out for more than 3 years?

Jacques Delors: Overall, our problems were no different than those of the other European countries, which were grappling with the same difficulties and a historical dilemma: progress or decline. So it was a matter of cushioning the harmful effects of the two oil price shocks and the rise in the dollar while adapting our production apparatus to a world and a technology that were undergoing a profound transformation.

It was a little like trying to square the circle, since the first of those requirements inevitably involved a phase of near stagnation in activity at a time when more growth was needed to stimulate our supply of production and thus facilitate its modernization. So far, contrary to what has happened in the other European countries, we have managed to straighten out production without retreating, and at the same time we have redirected sizable resources into investment and research.

I will get back later to the widespread crisis in the mixed economies, which must be a central point for political and economic reflection. But that is where the analogy with all the other countries, which are also behind in specific areas, stops.

In France's case, the task was and remains all the more unrewarding in that inflation in France is an endemic evil. Added to the inflation imposed by the rise in the price of petroleum and the dollar and that fueled by the automatic indexing of most incomes and prices is the "French sickness," meaning that the market functions poorly: competitive effort is not sufficiently developed. The middle classes--old and new--enjoy unearned incomes that have been jealously guarded with the complicity of the rightwing governments, which depended on them as the indispensable support for retaining the political majority. That is why everything had to be subordinated to a physical and psychological victory over inflation, whose origin is both cyclical and structural.

Lastly, we had gone to sleep between 1973 and 1981. By that I mean that except in certain high-tech sectors (nuclear energy and telecommunications) or in certain firms, our production apparatus was no longer among the leaders. The automotive industry is the unfortunate illustration of this: the Dalle Report forcefully stresses the point while also describing the means at our disposal for bringing about a recovery.

We are getting on our feet again, thanks primarily to a macroeconomic policy that is reconstituting the margin for self-financing, a savings policy aimed at productive investment, and incentives to establish and develop firms. But in this first phase, we are paying a high price in the form of higher unemployment.

Priority will have to be assigned to the education system--and I will have exhausted this subject by mentioning our weaknesses--so that it will be capable of responding to the immense task of adapting men and women to the world and economic life of today. The disappointment for me is all the greater in that since I designed the 1971 law on continuing education, I was expecting its effects to help transform the overall educational apparatus. Another disappointment, despite our efforts and proposals, is the disturbing inefficiency of our labor market. This just shows how much work remains to be done.

Manager and Educator

Paul Thibaud: The policy you pursued was and still is the target of criticism. For a time, it was a matter primarily of leftwing criticism. Some of that criticism was based on the assumption that it was possible to seal off the

national market. But the emphasis in other criticism was on the inadequate social dimension of that policy. In this respect, I note that you yourself, in describing the French economy's handicaps, talk about an archaic educational system and an archaic labor market, which are social factors. How does it happen that the Left, which seemed better prepared from the social angle, now finds itself with a deficit in that area?

Jacques Delors: This is the time to bring up two main questions. Should we not have been bolder in 1981? And how is it that the Left has not been able to mobilize the workers and citizens and involve them to a greater extent in this work of recovery?

Concerning the first question, it is true that another country, Sweden, chose competitive devaluation--that is, greater competitiveness in monetary terms--when the Socialists returned to power. It worked for the Swedish economy, which restored equilibrium in its trade balance. Swedish firms were greatly stimulated. On the other hand, the problem of inflation has not been solved, since it currently stands at around 8 percent. But that solution would not have worked in France because conditions are very different: the Swedish economy has always been very open to the outside world and, as a result, quick to regain shares of the world market. The French economy, on the other hand, has remained too "provincialist." The second point is that in Sweden--and this is one of the great virtues of social democracy--there has always been a convergence of thought and action between the Socialist Party and the trade unions (of which there are only two--compared to six in France!). That provides considerable support for a leftist government.

I am convinced that if France had chosen to devalue sharply and leave the European Monetary System, it would have sunk deeper into its bad habits. It probably would have gained a little in terms of foreign trade at the start, but that advantage would have been quickly canceled out by the continuation of two suicidal characteristics: recourse to inflation to resolve conflicts over the distribution of income, alleviate social tensions, and avoid facing up to the constraints imposed by better business management, and failure to realize that today more than ever, it is necessary to be present in all markets because the world has shrunk and has become our province.

Paul Thibaud: I find it interesting that you defend your policy much less in terms of management technique than in terms of educating the public. Doesn't that very insistence indicate a change of mind?

Jacques Delors: To reconcile reorganization and modernization, it was necessary to make people aware and open the way to changes in mentalities and behavior. There was misunderstanding and resistance, and some constraint as well. That is why Europe was a central element in the plan of action.

Paul Thibaud: That is the attitude of the politician, who systematically avoids smoothing over difficulties and tries instead to emphasize them. Doesn't it lay itself open to the charge of being a kind of demagoguery in reverse: "social sadism," as Alain Lipietz calls it?



Jacques Delors: I can understand that reaction, but the facts also have to be taken into account. In that respect, the test of May 1981 to June 1982 was extremely eloquent. The economic recovery was more than justified from the historical and political points of view. From the historical point of view, because those who had felt left out of society until then needed to be given guarantees that things were going to change. And the proof had to be partly material. Only theoreticians can look with condescension at such factors as the rise in the minimum wage, the higher family allocations, minimum resources for the elderly, and the development of low-cost housing. That group of measures was what made possible the next step--that is, acceptance, tinged no doubt excessively with resignation, of the recovery measures. And it was justified from the political point of view because in a democracy during the period just before and just after an election, economic constraints more or less take a back seat to electoral requirements. That is the rule everywhere. It can be observed in the United States, the FRG, Great Britain, and Italy. It is, in a way, the price of democracy based on freedom, alternation in power, and universal suffrage.

But in economic terms, let us get back to the recovery of 1981. It was justified by another basic consideration: when France dropped the Malthusianism that had characterized it before the war and became expansionist and modern, its firms did not believe in the change and contributed to it only when the domestic market justified action. That was one reason for trying to combine a modest domestic recovery with modernization and a greater interest in exports. But it happens that it did not work. Why? The reasons are many, probably because of the sort of trauma experienced by some company heads when the Left came to power, but also and especially because that recovery was a real-live test of the failure to adjust on the part of our production apparatus. In fields where we know how to produce, our firms have been incapable of responding even physically to domestic demand. Also at the time when that recovery was being carried out, experts in the big international organizations were predicting a recovery in the world economy, and particularly the European economy, for 1982. It did not happen. If it had happened, solving our problems would have been easier. But we still would not have escaped increased economic rigor and the need to change our behavior completely.

In any case, it was advisable to inform and then to speak loudly and clearly: to the international community, which was suspicious of the French experiment because France was turning its back on the dominant ideas and, I was about to say, fashions, and also to French society, which needed a sort of electric shock treatment. This was done in two stages:

First in June 1982, when, for the first time in our economic history, there was a freeze on incomes and wages, not just on prices.

Second, and especially, in March 1983, when some people felt that I was going too far with masochism. But if we had not used strong words at the risk of unpopularity, I believe that it would have been impossible to reverse the external and internal psychological factors. My austere talk was part of my policy of educating people for change. The social engineer that I consider myself to be has always believed that without understanding and then participation by

the actors or those in charge, it is impossible to succeed, no matter how well designed the laws are or how well adapted measures may be.

What that policy also had going for it was the fact that it was the only one consistent with the president of the republic's ambitions for France and for Europe.

Paul Thibaud: Within that framework, is it not true that a number of proposals that have sometimes been made remain valid? Examples would be a sectoral boost to the construction industry, where the rate of imports in terms of production is low, or policies for reducing labor costs in terms of the cost of capital. It is certain that wages bear a much larger share of the "social tax" in France than they do in other countries.

Jacques Delors: Reality was such that we no longer had any room for maneuver because of the intolerable imbalance in our internal accounts and the absence of a stimulus in our environment (specifically, no growth in Europe). But every time that we could support activity through such techniques for cyclical support as public works programs, selective housing measures, or lower interest rates, we did so. It must not be forgotten that every distribution of money increases overall demand and therefore, indirectly, our imports.

I will add that unfortunately, the steps taken could not be commensurate with the production capacity of our construction and public works industry, which had experienced an exceptional phase in the development of community facilities and housing from 1950 to 1970. There again, adaptation is necessary in the hope that we will find another potential for noninflationary growth and that we will then be able to use it to modernize our urban facilities and housing, a modernization that will constitute one of the basic elements of the new development model.

Another important issue is the need to improve competitiveness by reducing the indirect labor costs represented by social security taxes. I am in favor of it, on condition, of course, that the lower taxes based on wages are not immediately reflected in a correlative increase in direct wages. That was negotiable with the unions, and the question then became: how are we going to finance social security? I answered: by taxing income. People often talk about the excessive burden of direct taxes in France, but if we adopted the FRG's tax system, the tax would bring in an additional 60 billion or 80 billion francs in France. That is why, in June 1983, I proposed a proportional tax of 2 percent on all incomes to finance a solidarity fund intended to balance social security. My idea was to begin by increasing the share represented by the direct tax. The second phase would have involved funding family allocations through taxation--that is, the benefit accorded to families would have been granted through a reduction in the direct tax, with the result that families which pay no tax or not enough tax would have been subject to negative taxation. In other words, they would file a tax return showing that the amounts due them as family allocations were higher than their income tax. The state would then pay them the difference in the form of monthly payments.



No one agreed with me at the time, but I stand by my diagnosis: if we want to reduce the cost of labor and if we want to achieve fairer taxation, we will have to demand more from the income tax. I remind you that there is generally a ceiling on social security taxes based on wages. The result is indisputable: as a proportion of gross income, a worker pays more than an executive, a farmer, or a self-employed person if we add social security taxes to the income tax. Is that social justice or fair taxation? I will add that this redeployment of taxes and special levies is perfectly compatible with a decrease--desired, apparently, by everyone--in the total amount of compulsory deductions.

Paul Thibaud: One possibility would have been to transfer the financing of certain social security costs to the VAT [value-added tax]. This would have had considerable advantages as far as foreign trade is concerned.

Jacques Delors: I feel that if France were to experience price increases on the order of 3 or 4 percent, we might think about increasing the VAT and reducing social security taxes by an equivalent amount. But there is a time for everything. It is important first to win the fight against inflation, eliminate its structural causes, and convince the French that they are able to live--and live better--with relatively stable prices.

#### Leftists in Power

Paul Thibaud: Your insistence on the educational aspect of your actions leads me to ask you about the gap between the political cycle and the economic cycle. That gap characterizes all democracies, but has it not been accentuated in the case of France, and more especially the French Left, by the very special political heritage of people who have been in power only sporadically during a period of almost 80 years?

Jacques Delors: Let us take the simplest part first. France is a 50-50 democracy. To win--to bring alternation into play--it is necessary to mobilize one's loyal followers and also to win over some of the floating voters. In 1981, the Left rallied senior and middle executives, merchants, and craftsmen who were blaming the absence of growth not on the crisis but on the government. Considering the seriousness of that crisis and the failure of our economy to adjust, there could only be disappointment on the part of that group to begin with. But let us get back to the bulk of our troops: "the people on the left." They had felt left out, and they were reintegrated, but then they, too, experienced disappointments that it would be wrong to blame only on the economic policy. But discussing that would take us away from our subject. Let us remain in the economic and social area.

I would like to draw attention to one of the Left's temptations that was born of its history and has been nourished by its hope. It is the idea, considering what capitalism--which dominates internationally--is and considering what our country is, that the Left cannot remain in power for long and that it must mark its extremely brief time in power by a few basic and irreversible reforms. At the risk of being criticized, I believe that that temptation is in the minds of many. My stand has always been different. We in France must no longer contrast a generous and innovative Left with a Right that is conservative but good

managing. It is the Left's duty to show that it is capable of managing and that it is better able to adapt the French economy to the requirements of the future. If that proof is provided, the detestable climate of civil cold war that is kept alive by the Right will disappear, and the French will move toward alternation in power and toward a more peaceful and therefore more efficient democracy.

Paul Thibaud: What the French are noticing is that in order to govern, the Left has had to jettison its ideas. That dilemma has even become official, since the president of the republic acknowledges that he has a twin obligation--to those who elected him and to all the French--and adds that the second obligation is the prevailing one at present.

Jacques Delors: Alternation is not easy in France. Moreover, it has happened in a very special period: after 23 years of rightwing government on the one hand and, on the other, in a world undergoing profound changes. Let us imagine that Francois Mitterrand had won the election in 1965: it is obvious that reconciling the constraints of economic management and the desire to reach a new frontier would have been much easier than it is today. I consider that an important observation for understanding what has happened, not for looking for excuses.

That being said, let us recall that the Left was not unanimous concerning the means of achieving the desired changes. There were the supporters of a break--or of several breaks--but there were also those (I was one of them) who were advocating gradualism. Events decided in favor of the latter. Leftist talk must draw the consequences. Governing means seeking dynamic compromises among the actors on the economic and social stage rather than causing one camp to triumph over the other. Governing means rallying the greatest possible number of citizens while remaining true to oneself. Especially in periods of great challenges.

Paul Thibaud: One has the impression that you have succeeded--that a certain number of people on the left have successfully learned the economic lesson you are talking about, but that success is turning against the Left.

Why is it necessary to have leftists in power? That question is open, and behind it, obviously, is the problem, mentioned by you several times in this conversation, of the synergy between the economic and social realms: between economic development and social reform. There is a form of synergy that was once traditional: Keynesian social democracy. Everyone can see that it is worn out. What other synergy can be devised for the period ahead of us? If that question is not answered, it seems that the Left will have come to power in France only to lose the semblance of legitimacy it owed to an inappropriate ideology.

#### Some Ideas for Continuing

Jacques Delors: It is essential to defend and elucidate what has been done. But also to project into the future in a dialectic with action. That brings up two questions:

First, is it possible to reactivate the mixed economy--a successful product of social democracy--or should we give up and abandon the field to the ultraliberal counterrevolution?

Second, a mixed economy that is functioning again is the obvious answer, but what plan for society should it serve?

Let us talk first about restoring the mixed economy. That restoration is possible and necessary, and besides, there is no other solution. The debate today is completely distorted for a simple reason that ESPRIT has often denounced. During the 1950's and 1960's, the dominant ideas were, let us say, inspired by Marxism--an increasingly distorted Marxism. At the time, I was almost called names when I explained the merits of social democracy, particularly that in Sweden. Since the early 1970's, in reaction to domination by the Marxist vulgate, we have been witnessing the emergence of an ultraliberal ideology that is just as cursory and just as intransigent. We must struggle without flinching against this new intellectual dictatorship--this leaden shell.

Paul Thibaud: Leaden shell or passing fad?

Jacques Delors: It is an atmosphere--a mood. Politicians are often tempted by opportunism, you must remember. It should also be emphasized that modern economies are mixed in their essence, because they are based on the market, state intervention, and contractual negotiation. The question is how to restore the efficiency of the system.

Let us consider the French economy. We must have the competitive spirit and accept the market in those areas where it is most efficient. This is indisputable, but there still needs to be a change in behavior, because the same people who met in conclaves to denounce excessive state influence were in my office the next day asking for this or that tax benefit and this or that kind of protection. Progress has been made, but not enough so far, and there is still the danger of a turning back--of a return to the old familiar habits.

We must also rationalize the state's action. The state, which is responsible for macroeconomic policy, must give up its excessive selective interventions and create a stimulating and liberating framework for initiative. The state, as boss of the public sector, must combat the little empires that are too often built up by the managers of nationalized enterprises, but on the other hand, it must allow them to assume their responsibilities. Control by the state as stockholder is exercised after the fact. The state, as a provider of services, must think about the impact of those services on the standard of living, equality of access to those services, and the conditions for less costly management. In other words, it must think about productivity in government services. The state, as the partner in some cases of the other economic agents, must accept negotiation in that area.

In the third place, it is vital to facilitate dynamic compromise among the social partners. This is what, after the reforms I was able to get approved in 1969-1971, I called the contractual policy. In fact, it already existed (what I put through was more a revival than an invention). Compromise is

dynamic when it reconciles economic support and social progress. That is why, for the Socialists, revival of the contractual policy must be seen as an even greater necessity in that trade unionism is passing through a difficult phase and deserves consideration and support. When 10 percent of the active population is unemployed, the balance of forces is not in its favor. It is therefore the right time to open up new space for free discussion and negotiation--to bring up for debate the means of achieving more solidarity. There have been positive developments over the past 3 years, particularly in the wake of the law on new rights for the workers: the obligation to negotiate wages and working hours at the company level on the one hand and, on the other, the right of wage earners to express themselves concerning their working conditions.

We need a mixed economy that works, but for what purpose? There exists a certain view of relations between society and the individual--I was about to say the community and the person.... That is the basic split that is going to characterize the coming years. When I look at Japan, I find that despite the importance of the family unit, society takes precedence over the individual. And when I look at the current American model, I see that the individual--the strong man--is glorified at the expense of society.

The ambition of socialism is to give the individual every chance--to give him the opportunity to understand himself and others better and to play a social role. Because as Marx emphasized, the human being is a social animal. As for society, it must offer opportunities for communication among human beings and for cooperation so that civil society will be the creator of its own future. Society must be based on an economy in which the same principle prevails: the field of creativity open to all. That was and is the ideal of economic democracy which is upheld by social democrats, and for me, it represents the spread of the spirit of self-management.

We need a mixed economy that works and a more participatory and creative society. All the difficult questions raised by the achievement of those goals must be debated during preparation of the nation's development plan. Planning would then be rehabilitated--placed back in the saddle--as an instrument for making society more aware and more capable, to the extent possible, of controlling its future.

#### Changing Labor

Paul Thibaud: Currently, the social problem is obviously unemployment. And behind unemployment, there is more than one problem related to the current economic situation. For the individual, one question becomes agonizing: am I useful? Will I be able to win recognition in this system of exchanges and competition that constitutes the economy? Collectively, it appears that full employment, while it remains an objective, is no longer certain and that the right to work is an impossibility. The number of "human casualties" is increasing. It is the Left's vision of the future that has been refuted.

Jacques Delors: The Left cannot accept the prospect of sizable and lasting unemployment. That being said, it cannot provide a valid response unless it lucidly considers the phenomenon's consequences and then its causes.



The most serious consequence, as you have emphasized, is that people wonder about their social roles. The studies I made as a researcher clearly showed the personal tragedy represented by unemployment, especially for young people born into families where labor is held in high regard. It means a loss of identity that even becomes a sort of guilt feeling. Not to mention the ties with the rise in delinquency, the number of dropouts, and precarious situations. Lastly, how can one fail to see its effects on the way education is perceived in real life? "Why learn," say teenagers, "when my brother and sister, who have diplomas, can't find a job?"

As far as the causes are concerned, it is erroneous to blame insufficient economic growth alone. Higher unemployment is the price we are paying, unfortunately, for the failure of our economic structures to adapt. And for two reasons. For lack of competitiveness, we are selling less than we hoped to. And to regain our production capacity, we must modernize facilities, meaning a reduction in manpower at first. But we will not solve the problem by delaying the necessary restructuring--by saying: "Two more years, Mr Executioner." Quite the contrary, we would lose even more jobs, since we would then be even more "out of it."

Added to that, in France, is the poor functioning of the labor market, which I have already mentioned. An efficient market must make it possible simultaneously to give everyone a chance, facilitate mobility and advancement, and achieve the optimum allocation of resources. This is another area for negotiation and dialogue involving the state, the employers, and the unions that is too much ignored--a fundamental subject as far as renovating the training system is concerned.

But there are other possibilities, beginning with the underground economy, which could be reinserted into official channels if a few measures were adopted. There is also the new and very promising conduct of those who want to gain control of their time for living and alternate remunerated labor with activities that are more rewarding personally.

It is in terms of all those factors--on the basis of the new aspirations being expressed--that a new development model, more concerned with man's time and more respectful of natural equilibriums, can be designed.

If the Left does not tackle these issues head-on in the spirit that has just been indicated, what will happen? People will be extolling the virtues of competitiveness and the need to be high-powered performers in world markets. And it will be added that this is possible only if society stresses competition inside the country. The result will be a glorification of elitism--of the winner (which we even see on television programs)--and too bad for those who cannot keep up. That will be a formidable intellectual and social regression that the Left cannot accept. It must demonstrate in actual fact that reward for merit is compatible with the exercise of solidarity.

In my opinion, that is one of the most interesting fields for reflection so that the Left can start asking the French in 1986: "Do you want to give up these gains that we have brought to you? Do you want to deem the Left capable

of managing?" But we will then have to add immediately: "That is the type of society that you yourselves are going to build, and it will reconcile economic performance with social development (in the sense of a more convivial and more united society)." The answers can only be collective following a renewal of the debate that will involve the social movement, intellectuals, trade unionists, and the political left. My concern is to avoid leaving the field of ideas open to the reactionary forces.

### Business Enterprise

Paul Thibaud: But don't you feel that a question exists precisely concerning the role of the entrepreneur and of business enterprise? Everybody curses the employer in one respect: he is burdened by moral reprobation. Economics was even founded on the paradox that a personal vice can serve the common good. Among the major social roles, this is the only one that does not proceed in principle from a noble sentiment. But in another respect, it is obviously the social role that everyone needs. It is the employer's action that is the source of rights for others. Is the Left capable of integrating the spirit of enterprise into its vision of society? The "second Left" tried it, but did so by eliminating the entrepreneur--by trying to instill the spirit of enterprise in everybody (self-management), and that itself may be contradictory.

Jacques Delors: It is not one of Francois Mitterrand's lesser merits that he got the leftist culture in power to accept the necessity and reality of enterprise as the source of wealth. That is progress. But at that point we are stymied by a formidable question: should this recognition of enterprise lead us to the conclusion that, things being what they are, the entrepreneur must be set free from everything he considers, rightly or wrongly, to be hindrances? It is true that, as the current wisdom has it, more flexibility in the operation of the economy is needed. It is up to the social partners to debate this among themselves and then, if necessary, with the state. But the spirit of enterprise must flourish everywhere. And good management as well. Thence the need for the Socialists to give business initiative a certain "leftist" content.

I obtained unanimous passage by the National Assembly and the Senate of a law on the right to business initiative for anyone--who wants it. Under that law, such initiative is open both to the individual who, having established his firm, wants to expand it and to the individual who wants to establish a firm--and also to the wage earner who wants to take over or establish a firm. One category is missing from that law. It is what I have called the third sector--that is, new ways of getting together to work differently. This corresponds to the aspiration for self-management. Here again, we have an intellectual, practical, and political challenge for the Left.

From this point of view, and contrary to what is happening in certain other European countries, the Left must not be frightened by the possibilities for technical progress. On the contrary, it must place that progress in the service of its ideal and its economic practice. We must reduce the influence of Taylorism and change the "how of production."

Putting it simply, Taylorism involved a central core of skilled and semiskilled workers carrying out repetitive tasks according to a plan designed upstream by white-collar technicians, with former military men as personnel directors. Downstream, there were other white-collar people and skilled workers inspecting the work and repairing it. The result was the depersonalization of work, boredom with one's job, and absenteeism. Today, it is possible to produce better in smaller workshops and to participate in preparing, carrying out, and inspecting the work. What an opportunity for self-management!

Paul Thibaud: As you present it, self-management in no way eliminates the role of the entrepreneur. It is true that the role of the personnel doing the actual work can be conceived of very differently than it usually is today, as the example of Japan proves, but there remains the enigma constituted by the actual role of the entrepreneur: if there are unemployed people, the very good reason is that there are not enough entrepreneurs.

Jacques Delors: Let us say that in an enterprise, there are four functions which absolutely must not be confused with each other:

The first is that of decisionmaking. Decisions are ultimately the responsibility of one man, one woman, or one group. If that reality is rejected, one collectivizes the economy and enters into a pattern of inefficiency and irresponsibility. The one who decides must know that he will be recognized in society as someone who has assumed his responsibilities and the concomitant risks.

The second function is that of deciding how work should be organized, and this is done by the chain of command. A great many reforms are needed to ensure that command is exercised in conditions that are acceptable in our day. In this connection, Michel Crozier has spoken of the rejection of face-to-face encounters. Other business sociologists have emphasized the link between the appetite for power and the withholding of information. There can be no efficient and tolerable business undertaking without the wide circulation of information.

In the third place, there is the union. It is impossible to confuse this function with the others. Unionism is there to protect the moral and material interests of the workers. It cannot do so properly without remembering that it is in the firm that wealth is created and that as a consequence, the surplus produced must be distributed in a manner which is equitable but protects the future of the firm. I am not being paradoxical when I say that in a difficult period for them, some unions have been able to reconcile those elements. Even better, they have drawn up industrial counterproposals. The ground is therefore favorable for development in a positive direction.

There remains the fourth function: organization of the work unit. It is in the objective interest of the firm for everyone on the shop floor or in the office to feel that he is participating in the collective effort, that he is consulted, and that he is listened to when he suggests improvements. What is interesting in the present situation is that there is no radical opposition and no incompatibility between the economic requirement for the future and the social requirement. It is up to self-management socialism to devise and propose this new dynamic compromise!



## Credibility of Political Class

Paul Thibaud: In the considerable political commotion provoked by alternation in France--and you have very rightly drawn attention to many of its positive aspects--there is something that is disturbing: it is that politicians are tending to lose the esteem of the citizens because they look like puppets, saying one thing one day and something else the next. Raymond Barre's rise in popularity is due to the fact that he escapes that discredit. Do you have anything to say about the rules of political conduct that are needed so that politicians will deserve the esteem of their fellow citizens?

Jacques Delors: Raymond Barre is not the only one to escape what you call discredit--I would define it more as the political debate's lack of legibility, clarity, and reality. And when things are like that, democracy is in danger. That danger is currently greater in France because the Fifth Republic is revealing its flaws more clearly than its qualities and because of the obsession with the presidential election, which explains the behavior of our chief politicians. The logic behind that behavior makes no sense to the citizens, who would rather see debates on the specific problems of their existence and on the major issues involving action by France and Europe.

Lastly, one cannot be content, even though it is important, with the direct link between those in government and public opinion that is provided by mediate democracy. It is natural and sound to entrust to one's elected representatives the task of debating the most complex issues and suggesting solutions. It may sound reactionary, but I am in favor of limiting use of the referendum and restoring Parliament's role. Those same principles guide me when I act to bring unionism up to date.

Paul Thibaud: It is characteristic that referendum proposals are very popular. That is revealing.

Jacques Delors: In connection with a referendum on the war in Algeria, LE CANARD ENCHAINE once printed a headline which was funny but which, in my opinion, was worth more than a course in political science. It said: "Are you in favor of peace in Algeria and 300 kilometers of new superhighways per year?" We must have the courage today to say "Long live representative democracy" even if, on certain occasions, a referendum may prove necessary solely to verify the consent given to the institutions or to an action by the president of the republic.

Paul Thibaud: Doesn't the problem of credibility concern the Left in particular? Don't you think that it has a difficulty of its own, due to its ideological heritage, in doing what it says and saying what it does?

Jacques Delors: Certainly not. The spectacle currently being presented by the leaders on the right as they jostle for position in preparation for 1988 illustrates better than any other example could the shortcoming I have just denounced: the restricted and sophisticated nature of the debate and its lack of reality in the eyes of the citizens. For the Left, the basic issue is

primarily psychological: agreeing to stand up for what one must do in the national interest. It is also related to the vision of the future.

We have dealt with that at length, I hope, even if I have sometimes raised more questions than I have provided answers. But the essential thing is, first of all, to find one's footing in relation to what provides a living for us and to adopt an almost scientific humility concerning facts and people's real-life values. Because one cannot build except on the basis of those realities.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

COMMENTS ON ANNOUNCEMENT OF NEW ELECTORAL LAW

ND, PASOK Agreement Praised

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 13-14 Jan 85 pp 1, 3

/Article by Stamos Zoulas: "The ND-PASOK Rapprochement--A Guarantee for Normal Developments"/

/Excerpt/ The new electoral law, which will be introduced to the Chamber of Deputies /Vouli/ tomorrow, significantly changes our political scenario which prevailed until now. The change mainly concerns the reinforcement--if not the institutionalization--of the two-party system and the dictated reconsideration of the strategy by the two major parties. In this sense, the new electoral law significantly contributes to the elucidation of all those parameters of our political life which until now remained unclear (possible bipartisan cooperation, informal alliances, mutual overlapping of ideological or political areas, etc.). The new law to be enacted certainly lends more honesty and purity to the ND-PASOK confrontation and at the same time makes it more decisive and harder. Thus, it is deemed necessary that the irreproachable and equal conditions the new system establishes for waging a political battle should be supplemented by also guaranteeing normal conditions for a free and uninfluenced expression of the popular will in the next elections.

The key element, which renders the new electoral law different from the present, is the strengthening of the prospect for a party which wins a majority of votes to form a government even when the difference in votes it received is not much greater than those received by the opposition party. This prospect neutralizes--if not rendering negative--the multi-party system which is presumably served by the exceptionally parsimonious concessions the new laws make to the small parties. This is so because the incentive for the existence or the establishment of small parties is the collaboration with inter-party governments or the balancing or even the controlling role they play in the event of a governmental deadlock. Therefore, the more prospect of a government being formed by the party winning a majority of votes is strengthened the more the role and the raison d'etre of small parties is weakened.

## The Critical Choice

This element constitutes the most critical choice PASOK made in proposing the new law. Papandreou's party is willing to give battle with the ND on equal terms without the assistance or pre-election reserves or post-election alliances. At the same time, with this choice PASOK indirectly gives up or even overtly weakens its political motto of "never again the Right in power." In other words, the ideological-theoretical dilemma which existed until now is changing into the political reality of PASOK or ND.

When PASOK accepts to give battle against ND without resorting to the "superiority of the alliance with the Left" it either thoughtlessly downgrades the question of defeat or believes a victory by its opponent is within the rules of the game. It could be that Papandreou believes that the superiority of the 205,000 votes PASOK received in the Euroelections confirms his "prediction" that "the Right is sealed in the time capsule of history..."

Most probably Papandreou chose to propose this electoral system because he had no other option. As the outcome of events shows, the issue of a normal development of our political affairs was the basic object of all recent discussions between the premier and the president of the Republic. It makes sense to speculate that the electoral law should have been discussed in conjunction with the president's intentions in view of the upcoming presidential election which, together with the parliamentary elections, define the limits of the normal course of our political affairs.

Most possibly these discussions persuaded Papandreou that an honest and irreproachable electoral law strengthened the prospect of renewing Karamanlis' term and that, on the contrary, the imposition of a fraudulent election system would meet with prompt and decisive reaction by Karamanlis with consequences of unforeseeable intensity.

From this point of view, the achieved tripartite consent on the question of the electoral law (president, government and major opposition) is considered to be a most important step toward clarifying and--especially--normalizing our political life; a step which is expected to be completed by the joint support of the two major parties of the Karamanlis candidacy for the presidency next March.

Of course, the continuous efforts by Karamanlis to secure the institutions and the normal operation of the political system and the convergence of ND and PASOK positions on the two most important issues--the electoral law and the presidency--constitute a very significant achievement. Much more so since this convergence of the two parties concerns the future and in a way binds their political behavior toward each other and toward Karamanlis.

## The Significance of the Agreement

It is indicatively said that the ND-PASOK agreement on the two fundamental issues considerably limits the field of their ideological and political confrontation and naturally downgrades all cases of rifts on their particular differences. Most importantly, it eliminates the sources of political fanaticism in the electoral rank and file. This is so because the voters, after ascertaining the rapprochement of the two adversaries on our crucial political issues, would not be easily rallied in the future by polarizing or decisive slogans which serve only party expediciencies without expressing real situations in our political life.

This assessment is also strengthened by the positive acceptance by both major parties of the decisive role Karamanlis plays in the course of our political affairs. This is the real meaning of the bipartisan support and the expected unanimous election of Karamanlis to the presidency of the Republic until the spring of 1990.

On the other hand, the changes the new law provides concerning the inter-party competition are also very meaningful. PASOK's desire to win a majority and form a government raises many questions which mainly concern KKE's reaction. Many believe that Papandreou has already been given guarantees that the KKE reaction will be "level headed" and will not be expressed in the form of a rift or confrontation especially in the sensitive "areas of the masses" where the cooperation of the two parties dictates an extended--and precarious for the government--social calmness.

PASOK officials support the view that KKE's displeasure also must be overlooked for other reasons. First, the Papandreou party does expect to increase its votes with the help of KKE voters. And second, the new law will certainly benefit KKE by two-three seats in the Vouli. This second observation is directly connected to PASOK's clear designs on the KKE-Int. electoral strength. Indeed, PASOK believes that the three percentage units KKE won in the 1984 Euroelections compared to the 1981 general elections were won at its expense and will contest them in the next elections in every way it knows.

However, regardless of PASOK's friction or competition with the two communist parties, the fact remains that its fight for electoral majority strengthens the centrist titles Papandreou invokes. And this, to the extent that the charges for a common front are losing strength while the suspicions about post-election cooperation are weakening.

The opposition party must seriously consider this new element when it charts its new election tactics. Its arguments should be directed against PASOK's performance which betrays the centrist ideology rather than toward its threatened intentions.



## Redistribution of Seats

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 13-14 Jan p 1

/Text/ The parliamentary seats are being redistributed in many areas due to the massive internal migration of the Greeks during the past 10 years.

According to the 1981 census, the results of which will be announced in the next few days, 10 to 13 seats will be taken from provincial districts and added to urban ones.

### Who Loses

According to our information the following nomes will lost seats:  
Aitolokarnainia from 9 to 8; Arkadia from 5 to 4; Ileia from 7 to 6;  
Karditsa from 6 to 3; Kefallinia from 2 to 1; Rodopi from 4 to 3; and Samos from 2 to 1.

On the other hand, the number of seats are increased in the following districts:  
The Athens Second District which showed the greater population increase during the 1970-1980 decade. Its number will increase from 28 to 32. The Remainder Attiki District will have one more seat and will elect seven instead of six deputies. In the Salonica First District the seats are increased from 12 to 13; in Drama from 3 to 4; in Ioannina from 5 to 6; in Kastoria from 1 to 2 and in Pieria from 3 to 4.

Indicatively, we mention that in 1958 the Athens First District had 16 seats, while today it has 22. However, the greatest increase in seats is observed in the Athens Second District. In 1958 it had 10 seats. The 1981 census will raise the number to 32.

By contrast, since 1958 we see a continuous decrease of seats in the island districts. In Lesbos the number of seats dropped from seven to four and in Khios from three to two.

It is reminded that the "legal" population of the country according to the 1971 census was 8,768,641 persons. The 1981 census shows a population of 9,660,000 persons.

It is also noted that most of the deputies--50 percent of the national representation--are elected in the large urban centers (Athens, Salonica, Patrai, Irakleion) and the rest from the mainland provinces and the island districts which have the smaller representation.

In conclusion, one could say that, with the exception of Athens, the population of the urban centers is steadily increasing. At the same time, one may observe an overall population decrease in small provincial cities and a greater decrease in the islands which, as noted above, are losing seats in an impressive way.

## PASOK-KKE 'Moratorium' 'Overthrown'

Athens | KATHIMERINI in Greek 13-14 Jan 85 pp 1, 3

/Article by N. Nikolaou: 'New Law Upsets the Government-KKE Moratorium' /

/Excerpt / PASOK's Executive Office is urgently searching for ways to preserve the moratorium with KKE which undoubtedly received a hard blow when the government defiantly violated its promise to establish the simple proportional (electoral) system. This search is assuming an agonizing character as the labor demands and the new upsurge of prices in the market create favorable preconditions for social turmoil.

PASOK's partisan and syndicalist cadres anxiously face this gloomy prospect because they figure that extended massive and aggressive mobilizations which will coincide with the pre-election period could be destructive to the party's influence.

### A Climate of Turmoil

According to reliable economic sources within the PASOK Executive Office as well as among all the party's cadres, there exists a climate of turmoil which is augmented by a fear concerning the party's fate in the October elections. For this reason strong pressures are exerted on Papandreou who is being asked to point out his sharp differences with the opposition party on the electoral law issue and to find ways for re-establishing PASOK's close relations with the traditional Left.

These pressures include minor proposals by the Executive Committee for changing the electoral system (as concerns the manner of distributing the vacant parliamentary seats) as well as major proposals of great importance such as hastening the electoral confrontation before the election of the president of the Republic.

According to assessments by these economic circles, Papandreou is not about to accept these proposals because he considers them a result of either a panic or bias caused by the difficulties faced by the party's cadres who until now have become accustomed to the alliance with the Left, an alliance which allowed them to exercise undisturbedly their power in various areas of activity.

Papandreou and the staff close to him believe the reinforced proportional system is the only way for PASOK to win a majority in the next elections and to form a government, thus enabling him during the post election period to shape, in a dominating and sovereign way, the front of cooperation with the parties of the Left.

The electoral majority (independence in forming a government) is sought at any price because Papandreou and his collaborators know full well the problems

the new government will face in the economic sector, a fact which will make necessary the implementation of hard and anti-democratic measures. It is clear, however, that as a matter of dogmatism it is not easy for the traditional Left to propose such measures whether in an opportunistic way or in a best possible way. Of course the Left could agree to cooperate in the implementation of these measures, but such a decision on its part pre-assumes--as the precedent of cooperation between the socialists and communists in France proved--a self-independence (electoral majority) and strength of the biggest party which invites the Left to share the responsibilities of a policy for the stabilization of the economy and not to dictate the government's orientations. It is not, therefore, probable that Papandreou will change his mind concerning the electoral law, thus leading PASOK to defeat so that Gennimatas and Laliotis could preserve the Marxist cadre profile!

For the same reasons one can exclude early elections as recommended by known PASOK leaders who are behind certain anti-Karamanlis printed matter. Papandreou is smart enough to know that any hint to the people about a possible confrontation with the president would give the signal for massive voter desertions which will result in PASOK's shrinking to the hard core whence it started in 1974.

#### Relations With KKE

According to the same economic circles, Papandreou in contrast to his party's cadres, does not seem to be at all concerned about his future relations with KKE and, at any rate, does not believe the moratorium observed until now can change into bitter confrontation and competition. His optimism is based:

--First, on the wisdom of KKE's leadership which, with the policy it followed until now, has proved that it knows to place in the forefront the long-term interests of the party in order to gain opportunist profits which may provoke reactions or shrink to extinction tomorrow.

--Second, on the feasibility of his government to offer KKE recompenses in other sectors and mainly in the syndicates and the Local Self-Government.

--Third, on his ability to invent in the foreign policy sector manipulations which secure for him not only the tolerance but also the overt support of the countries with Soviet-style socialism. Such policy has, of course, a direct impact domestically and this is well recognized by Papandreou who has used to good advantage these manipulations many times in the past.

Finally and most importantly, Papandreou keeps always the door open for a post-election cooperation with KKE on a governmental level and knows very well that this vision touches and placates those who in a state of anger long for a confrontation.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

# SUCCESS, FAILURE OF PASOK OFFICIALS GAUGED

Athens ENA in Greek 10 Jan 85 pp 10-11

/Text/ Unknown until 1 October 1981, today's cabinet members are on everyone's lips. In the opinion of the premier himself the fact that only he in the government has previous political experience impeded as a negative element the government's course.

Of course, during moments of euphoria, as at the first cabinet meeting for example, Papandreou identified the inexperience of his ministers with the renewal of the political world. But at moments of disappointment, as those of the night the Euroelections' results were announced, the PASOK chairman admitted dejectedly that "we are beginners."

In any event, the fact remains that PASOK is the only political party which renewed all categories of the political world. During the first 3 years of his government's term, he put in the limelight both those in the PASOK vanguard (the successful ministers, that is, who play the role of "battering ram" in the electoral body) as well as the vulnerable targets--the provocative failures--which will surely have a negative impact on the electoral struggle.

Without doubt in the first category of PASOK's successful cadres belong Chamber of Deputies /Vouli/ Speaker G. Alevras, Minister to the Premier Ap. Lazaris, Agriculture Minister K. Simitis and Health and Welfare Minister G. Gennimatas. For a victory in the forthcoming elections Papandreou relies on these four "aces".

Giannis Alevras, who early in his political career was surprised by his election as Vouli speaker, discovered soon enough that the third highest state office served him doubly: It provided him prestige and protected him from the debilitations a government office provokes. In addition, the climate of good relations with the major opposition party, a climate his office dictates and which he took care to cultivate, assured him a general acceptance even among the ND deputies. Thus, for Papandreou, Alevras constitutes a precious reserve for attaining many goals--the presidency of the Republic, a government of bipartisan cooperation--a reserve, however, in which the premier would not like to seek refuge.

Lazaris is Papandreou's second golden reserve. He is very illustrious, quiet and conciliatory. In the Vouli he puts his adversaries in a difficult position who, in order to be in a position to criticize the government, are obliged to defer to him rather than to Koutsogeorgas, his predecessor in the Ministry to the Premier or to Arsenis, his successor in the Ministry of Finance.

"First among all equal ministers" in every PASOK government, Lazaris stands apart from the others for the collective spirit prevailing in his work and for decentralizing responsibilities. He won the characterization of a "good manager who heads the most complex Greek enterprise"--the public administration.

Both Alevras and Lazaris would be unknown to the public were it not for the favorable comments, especially by the opposition press. Of course, what they gain by their being generally accepted, they pay as a price in the narrow PASOK party framework since the characterization of "being acceptable by the opposition" is not considered a certificate of merit of a partisan offer.

K. Simitis and G. Gennimatas, both members of PASOK's Executive Office, became by general admission, PASOK's ministers because of valuable services they rendered to the party. Simitis, a professor of commercial law at the Pandeios School, owes most of his success to the Community support. To his credit, however, the Ministry of Agriculture he heads has shown administrative flexibility and in the technocratic level has proved capable of effectively carrying out the negotiations being conducted with Community standards.

Moreover, there were many times when, during meetings of EEC ministers of agriculture that Simitis felt his prestige at stake as a result of arbitrary actions by other Greek services. Even during the stormy debate in the Vouli on the draft law concerning the cooperatives, Simitis kept the debate on a decent political level and ideological confrontation despite the fact that there were many moments of tension and even though the ND criticism covered "all issues" it "benefited all concerned."

In the two ministries he has served, G. Gennimatas has left the impression of a tireless, methodical and determined official who believes in dialogue. As he has repeatedly said, he was primarily interested and still is in the local Self-Government which, however, he had to leave rather early following the demands of other PASOK cadres who felt that the fame he gained coupled with the strength his good relations with the mayors provided, made him especially dangerous.

In the Ministry of Health Gennimatas had a strong, perhaps the strongest, PASOK weapon: the National Health System /ESY/. His methodical ways and good TV propaganda will make ESY the most attractive and effective PASOK electoral campaign issue.



In contrast to G. Alevras, K. Simitis and G. Gennimatas, who are PASOK Executive Committee /EG/ members and who have greater appeal, A. Tsokhatzopoulos and K. Laliotis, who are also EG members, appear to be satisfied with the power they derive in the narrow framework of the party mechanism.

K. Laliotis perhaps represents the only case of a party cadre whose political identity has added nothing to his government image. On the contrary, Tsokhatzopoulos used his increased power in the government framework--a power derived from his close relations with Papandreou--to become the number two person in the party hierarchy and assume the responsibility of curtailing PASOK's decay in urban centers. Both of them, however, do not appear to be efficient as "electoral touts" given that in the Attiki basin as well as in other districts the governing party continues to lose votes.

Interior Minister M. Koutsogeorgas and Justice Minister G. A. Mangakis will, without doubt, be electoral weapons for the government. They may, however, prove to be coomerangs since Koutsogeorgas, even though he comes from the area of the Center, is liked only by the fanatic PASOK anti-rightists while G. Mangakis seems to be losing the impression of "authenticity" and his "professorial style" because of his meddlings with justice. He gives the impression that he wants to successfully overcome various intransigence tests. His service performance is high but the same cannot be said about his public prestige.

Arsenis' relations with the party hard core are complex. Early in the PASOK administration the "czar of economy" was characterized as rightist and conservative since his first political action was to delay the Automatic Cost of Living Adjustment until 1983 and "Article 4" until later still.

At the end of 1983 Arsenis was able to secure the consent of the PASOK Executive Office, outflanking the "party hardliner" G. Pottakis. Earlier he had bypassed D. Koulourianos who was considered as "a miser technocrat." Arsenis' popularity certainly is not high. All recognize that he is an authority in his profession (economics) but he supports political positions he does not share.

Minister of Labor Evang. Giannopoulos is considered successful only by the employers but not the employed. Both government spokesman D. Maroudas and Minister of Public Order G. Skoularikis are without doubt vulnerable targets. The first has decided to identify his own prestige with the frequency of successive denials which subsequently refute themselves. On the contrary, Skoularikis, who had political ambitions, cannot in all honesty boast about police effectiveness during his days as public order minister.

PASOK, therefore, will hold only a few aces and many discarded cards in the next electoral battle. However, it will base the outcome on one strong card: the charismatic personality of Andreas Papandreou.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

# PASOK-KKE COEXISTENCE SEEN COMING TO END

Athens ENA in Greek 10 Jan 85 p 12

/Text/ The PASOK-KKE "betrothal" was intended to last only 1 year--the period the government "matchmakers" thought was needed for a climate of good relations with the communist Left. As much a period, that is, as was needed by the PASOK government to avoid finding itself "in the middle of the crossfire."

Already, however, and in view of the forthcoming elections, the staffs of the two parties felt that any extension of the informal coexistence would cause harm rather than benefit to both parties.

The PASOK leadership's assessment was that "a parallel orbit with KKE"--sometimes, moreover, adjacent to each other--"surely would be the best way for attracting anew the centrist voters." A weighing element for such an assessment was also PASOK's orientation toward Karamanlis' re-election to the presidency. KKE, on the other hand, assessed the results of the Euroelection results and those in a number of unions and concluded that the partnership with PASOK brought it only harm and not gains.

The skirmishes between the two parties started last summer by PASOK by reason of the "purchase of the century" (airplanes) and the anticipated agreement concerning the Voice of America /relay stations/.

Formally, the initiative for such skirmishes belongs to KKE given that after the Euroelections the PASOK leadership concluded that it could achieve a majority in the parliamentary elections only at the expense of the Left. In the meantime, KKE escalated its competition on the whole spectrum of political life: the pupils and students who are members of the Greek Communist Youth are at the forefront of mobilizations in the area of education; the members of the Antidictatorial Labor Movement and the Greek General Confederation of Labor are obstructing the signing of the National Collective Agreement; mayors-cadres of KKE "are collaring" the minister of the interior demanding assistance for their municipalities; RIZOSPASTIS castigates the government as "manager of the establishment;" and the party's Central Committee proceeds with the publication of a KKE "mini-government program"...which strongly underlines KKE's opposition to PASOK's way of governing more than to any of the party's "governmental ambitions."

PASOK's answer was sharper than ever. Papandreou himself accused KKE of not understanding the present reality; that it is pinned to the marginal percentages of 10-11 percent; and that it learned nothing from the errors of the past. Papandreou uttered these accusations in a speech to PASOK cadres from all over Greece, and he chose this audience in order to ask KKE "to stop the revolutionary gymnastics" meaning the dynamic mobilizations. Before this same leftist audience, Papandreou alluded to two things which infuriated the communists.

The first: He asked KKE to compare PASOK's income policy with that of the Soviet-type socialist countries. The second and worse insinuation was the expression of hope that "the KKE leadership will finally come to its senses." Everyone understood of course on whom (on what big country) Papandreou based his hopes that KKE will finally come to its senses. But the communists revolted.

The answer of KKE's press office was ready but was not released to the press because sounder minds prevailed. But the substance of Papandreou's insinuations were openly expressed by the premier's advisor And. Stratis through the columns of TO VIMA on 23 December 1984. He asked the PASOK leadership: "How dare you ask for cooperation when you call us managers of the establishment?"

More revealing than the premier's advisor was the newspaper EXORMISI which in an article placed KKE before the dilemma, "PASOK or tanks."

The convenience with which PASOK's staff is attacking KKE is justified. First, because Papandreou knows that whenever he asks for KKE's cooperation or even support, he will have it. Therefore, he has no reason to lavish compliments on KKE's Secretary General Florakis. Second, according to the estimates of Papandreou's close associates, the votes of the Left will be directed toward PASOK through "the committees of the anti-rightist citizens" who will soon appear on the political scene.

But the intensity of the PASOK polemics against KKE is not used only for PASOK's buttressing by the Left. According to political observers, it is a peculiar way for PASOK to show a centrist annointment on its face--a way not toward the Center, but away from the Left...

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POLITICAL

GREECE

POLITICAL SPECTRUM DISCUSSES REPORTED PASOK-KKE DIFFERENCES

Problems in GSEE

Athens TA NEA in Greek 9 Jan 85 p 22

[Article by V. Tzannetakos]

[Excerpt] An open disagreement among both labor (GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor]) and employer representatives was limited in the GSEE's formal meeting--in respect to other matters--on 8 January 1985 with employer organizations (industrialists, merchants, and professional craftsmen) for the conclusion of the 1984 National Joint Convention of Labor.

The disagreement in the GSEE between PASKE [Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement] (PASOK) and ESAK-S [United Anti-dictatorial Labor Movement--Cooperating] (KKE) about the content of labor demands, had been evident for 2 months, but on 8 January 1985 it took a new turn when the general secretary of the GSEE (ESAK-S) participated in and spoke at the meeting organized outside the GSEE offices at the same time as the dialogue between the GSEE and the employers.

This meeting had the character of an exercise of pressure on the majority of the GSEE (PASKE) to revise its position on earnings and to put forward more substantial demands.

When speaking to the gathering--which had been organized by associations chosen by ESAK-S--the GSEE secretary accused the government of wanting to apply a policy of one-sided frugality and called on the GSEE to break off the dialogue with the employers and to redefine its demands. In addition he warned both the government and the GSEE "that the trade union organizations will continue increasing the scale of their mobilization efforts for overturning the governmental earnings policy accepted by the majority of the GSEE." He stated that these mobilization efforts had nothing to do with party expediency or promptings.

At the ESAK-S meeting "tough" warning signals predominated for both the GSEE and the government.

## Mutual Accusations

Athens TA 1984 in Greek 23 Dec 84 p 5

[Article by V. Tzannetakis; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in bold-face]

[Excerpts] The relationship between PASOK and the KKE has entered into a very delicate phase, its typical and essential cause the significant differences of opinion about and evaluations of the direction and content of government policy as well as the prospects of making the Allagi [Change], materialize, which has been promised by PASOK.

As the time for elections is drawing closer and various matters remain "open" from an official viewpoint--from the election of a president of the Hellenic Republic to the settlement of relations with NATO, and so forth--a gradual hardening in the political tactics and practice of the KKE can be noted, viewed objectively.

The government has opposed the KKE's rebellion rather vigorously, as follows from the positions which leading government and party figures have expressed in accordance with the object of the "recalculation" from the ministers of education and the interior to the mayor of Athens and the majority of the GSEE [Greek General Confederation of Labor].

Accordingly the prime minister's speech on 15 December 1984 delimited in an absolute manner PASOK's relationship and intentions with respect to the KKE, which was "indirectly but plainly" accused of "undermining" the Allagi by bringing up untimely and excessive demands.

According to the prime minister, /"The KKE once again is unable to perceive the point of important political and social concurrence,"/ is carrying out a /"rebellious exercise,"/ and is /"dividing the movement of the people."/

These accusations are undoubtedly strong and indicate that in the immediate future the government strategy will continue in the same mode.

The KKE did not limit itself only to accusing government policy of turning more conservative, but its censure also materialized with a wave of mobilized areas and intrigues wherever the KKE exercises control or influence.

The tendency which exists within the government to delimit the relationship of PASOK with the KKE will very probably have immediate consequences on the trade union movement, where the soil is fertile for favoring the standpoint of cutting off collaboration, with the argument that the KKE no longer has anything but problems to offer to PASOK.

/The KKE campaign, with its proposals for "getting out of the economic crisis, economic relief for the workers, and an independent development of the country for the benefit of the people," constitutes a peak in the "corrosive" criticism on government policy./



This campaign contains indications and proposals which are clearly far from the corresponding government positions and which in this sense could be characterized as "anti-government." The energetic activity of the KKE--which aims both at protecting its electoral base and attracting leftist voters, who do not belong to it and are rather prone to voting for PASOK at the last minute--reminds one a great deal of the related KKE campaign in 1981. At that time the KKE aimed at a disproportionate increase in its power (the well-known 17 percent), in which a yes would mean an anti-Right majority but a no would mean power for PASOK by itself.

The same aim appears to be in the forefront now, with the additional argument that PASOK's being in power has not returned the results expected and that things went from going back on promises to concessions which changed the sense and the meaning of the Allagi. Because of this the KKE is again bringing up the matter of "democratic collaboration" for forming a government with its participation and an agreement on a common program in order to bring the Allagi into being, as the KKE understands and proposes it.

These proposals were rejected by the government which is looking at being in power by itself and explains that the polemic exercised by the KKE from the earnings issue to the "market of the century" is more for vote gathering. The KKE polemic in the end benefits the Right since it aims at splitting the anti-Right popular majority and reducing the KKE to a regulating factor.

#### PASOK, KKE Growing Nervousness

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 24 Dec 84 p 4

[Article by Ap. Apostolopoulos]

[Excerpts] The more probable it is that a mild atmosphere will prevail until the next elections--which will probably be set for next October--the more PASOK and the KKE show evidence of intense nervousness.

Political observers consider this development normal if it is believed, as the KKE does and Mitsotakis has noted, that PASOK is applying the ND's policy to the great matters of foreign and domestic policy.

On the other hand, on these matters--its relationship with NATO and the EEC, domestic reforms--the KKE adheres essentially to its known positions despite whatever wishes its leading cadres might have and certain changes in the wording of the party's resolutions.

This deterioration is no longer appearing only in RIZOSPASTIS headlines or in the articles of some pro-government newspapers, but it is being emphasized more and more often in the speeches of the prime minister himself as well as in the resolutions of the guiding organs of the KKE. Most significant, however, is that in actual practice the KKE "is pushing" the deterioration with PASOK, spurring it on with strikes and mobilizations.

Political observers question how far the disagreements of PASOK and the KKE can go. The government is already letting it be understood that the disagreements are unbridgeable.

PASOK, with holding power by itself its official dogma, is trying at least to remain the leading party. It knows that the battle will be decided in the Center because--as PASOK knows--the KKE is objectively in a weak position to threaten it seriously.

The KKE leadership has the feeling that the dilemma of PASOK or the Right, even if it is old hat, influences quite a few leftist voters, especially the older ones. The sought-for destruction of PASOK must, therefore, not create a feeling of danger in PASOK's followers about the Right returning, which appears as a bogymen.

The KKE is also obliged not to endanger its image as a loyal party by an excessive amount of aggressiveness which the government will probably insist on confronting in an effective manner.

Finally, the KKE recognizes that a frontal attack on PASOK will intensify its followers' party loyalty more than getting them out of the cage they are in.

The KKE laid out its defensive strategy through Florakis: not one vote is to be lost for the party. The dispute will flare up--in order to protect this defensive arrangement on all sides, but it will not reach the point of a breach. Even if at bottom the KKE would want a breach, it cannot do it. Perhaps PASOK can. For PASOK to want to create a rupture, however, it will have to be certain that it will not lose any of its leftist members. This is why it cannot feel secure.

#### Possible PASOK-KKE Cooperation

Athens KYRIAKATIKI ELEVTHEROTYPIA in Greek 6 Jan 85 p 9

[Article by Potis Paraskevopoulos]

[Excerpts] The government and the PASOK party leadership announce at every opportunity their certainty that in the upcoming elections the people will give them an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies in order to continue applying the program of Allagi [Change] without interruption.

This is a legitimate announcement and every party leadership which looks at acquiring power with this perspective and aspiration is always carrying on the election struggle. Every political leadership, however, and especially the one which is exercising government power, also studies alternative solutions for the case in which the electoral body does not comply with its expectations. Here is where the problem for the PASOK leadership crops up along with the leaderships of the other political parties.

A sober estimation of Greece's political givens today can determine as follows the possibilities of a political collaboration of PASOK with other parties:

On Greece's national affairs and international relations: The positions of the parties PASOK, ND, part of the communist left (KKE-Int.), and the Center are not in opposition to each other, and where they do not coincide they converge. A basic opposition exists only with the KKE which rejects even in operation the alliances and agreements of Greece with NATO and the U.S., and the enrollment in the EEC.

On economic affairs and social policy: There exists a substantive disagreement between PASOK and the ND on the general orientation of economic and social policy. In PASOK's policy they weight the benefits of the workers and the principles of the redistribution of income in favor of the people. The ND policy is dominated by the interests of capital.

Radical differences do not exist in the structures of the economy, at least not as the resonant words socialism and capitalism present them. The smallest or greatest extent in the sector of private initiative does not change the structure of the economy and society. The development of the agricultural co-operatives is not an unknown phenomenon in capitalistic economies, as the leadership of the ND insists on emphasizing shouting about the sovietization of the rural economy. Besides, even in these matters the position of the ND is not uniform, just as its political area is not uniform.

On the subjects of economic and social policy PASOK can find a "common language" also with the communist Left (KKE and KKE-Int.), with smaller or larger reciprocal obligations, without the progress toward Allagi being suspended or forced. As for the KKE, marching in common can be only short-lived because a long-lived common march is impossible as long as the KKE insists on the soviet model of socialism.

On the subject of political freedoms and parliamentary democracy: Here the differences of PASOK's policy with that of other parties are not great. An exception is anti-Communism, which continues to reign in a great portion of the ND, and democratic conservatism reigns throughout practically all of the ND. With the KKE the differences are to be found in their utmost ambitions. With the KKE-Int., theoretically at least, there exists a concurrence, independently of its criticisms on certain government actions and perceptions.

From these assessments and comparisons it follows that we cannot rule out post-election collaboration on the part of PASOK with other parties or political powers which may be created. For this reason let everyone in the pre-election period take care that unbridgeable and divisive gulfs not be created.

#### PASOK-KKE Relations

Athens TO VIMA in Greek 10 Jan 85 p 11

[Article by Giannis Roumbatis; passages enclosed in slantlines printed in bold-face]

In the past there were many who maintained that nothing would disturb the relationship between PASOK and the KKE because--so they said--there was a sort of "silent agreement" between the two parties. An "agreement" which, it is

supposed, was imposed on the KKE by leading figures who are located primarily outside of Greece. This theory began to collapse when the differences between the KKE, on the one hand, and the government and PASOK, on the other hand, kept expanding. They have now covered almost the entire spectrum of the political and economic matters which occupy Greeks today.

There is no longer anything remaining outside of the field of confrontation: /election law, foreign policy, earnings policy, economic policy, trade unionism, changes in the laws/, now constitute points of tension in the KKE's relationship with PASOK. It is certainly significant that influential figures in the KKE do not hesitate now to stress that their party will intensify the criticism which it is bringing to bear on the government.

In the KKE they do not allow any doubt that "PASOK has deepened its compromise with the status quo" and stress that "a three-cornered compromise has followed the compromise at the top." They believe, that is to say, that in the substantive matters which occupy Greece today there exists an /atypical accord between President of the Hellenic Republic /K. Karamanlis,/ Prime Minister /A. Papandreou,/ and leading figures of the ND. This accord--they say--concerns the following subjects:

/First,/ it has been decided that an alternation of power will exist within the framework of "a /two-party game."/

/Second,/ the election law has a dual aim: to validate the atypical accord which has begun to exist between PASOK and the ND and to squeeze the KKE.

/Third,/ a coincidence of viewpoints exists between the government and the ND about the basic choices on matters of foreign policy. These matters are NATO, American bases remaining in Greece, the purchase of new airplanes, and the EEC. There are, of course, differences about the way in which the government is handling them, but not about their essence.

/Fourth,/ despite the "demagogic exaltations of the ND," the economic policy which the government is following does not differ very much from that of the governments which existed before 1981. It is typical, they are saying in the KKE, that the SEV (Association of Greek Industrialists) is continually expressing itself in favor of an "/assenting economic policy."/

More concretely, on the subject of earnings policy, the KKE disagrees absolutely with the government's positions and asks that reparative sums be given in order to "stabilize the income of the workers."

/Fifth,/ in legal matters as well, where the ND has expressed many times its opposition, a policy is being followed by the government--according to the KKE--which gives "the impression that there is development." In reality, however, the government is /filtering the people's demands, severing their nerves, and incorporating them into the system."/ Thus a ["]modernization of the legal framework of Greek capitalism is not taking place very successfully."



At any rate, key figures in the KKE emphasize that the "three-cornered compromise," which they certify exists, does not mean that antagonisms have been wiped out, but in the name of an "abstract anti-Right polemic" the government is trying to gain /"assent broader than that which the Right had created."/

At this point there exists some sensitivity because the policy which the KKE is following can be criticized by PASOK in case the Right returns to power. KKE leading figures say that /"in no case,/ in the name of an abstract anti-Right polemic, /would the KKE support PASOK from the left/ in the government's two-party rivalry with the ND."

The same people stress that "the KKE would not be responsible if some form of a rightist government returned to power. This would be a consequence of the policy which the government is following generally, the election law which it is furthering, which can constitute a trap for PASOK itself, and its refusal to collaborate." They explain that "inevitably the /two-party game means an alternation of power/ with some form of the ND, in cooperation or not with PASOK."

The criticism which the KKE is thus bringing to bear on the government is now on everything. Circles in the KKE say, however, that their party "wants to avoid that degree of dramatizing which would impede furthering a dialogue with PASOK's world."

In the past, KKE General Secretary /Kharilaos Florakis/ had foreseen that there would be rearrangements in the area where PASOK operates. For the KKE, independently of the policy which the PASOK leadership is following, "there is always ground open for dialogue and collaboration /with the world/ of PASOK."

This will be possible, they maintain in the KKE, because "the compromises which the chiefs make do not necessarily pass through to the masses. If in the end these compromises are carried out, then in order to denounce them the KKE will address itself to the people in general and to the world of PASOK in particular."

In the KKE they stress, however, that the criticism which is being brought to bear about the /"three-cornered compromise"/ does not mean that the party "is adopting a anti-Karamanlis stance without social content.["] The criticism is taking place, they say, because the president of the Hellenic Republic can /"be good for today's order of things but be unsuitable for a course of change."/

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POLITICAL

GREECE

PERILS, FAULTS OF ELECTORAL SYSTEM NOTED

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 18-24 Jan 85 pp 8-9

/Article by N. D. Delipetros: "The Electoral System: Honest But Dangerous"

/Text/ It has been repeatedly stated that the electoral system the government proposes with the draft law it submitted in the Chamber of Deputies /Vouli/ is an honest system in the sense that it does not defraud the ballot; it is election fraud free for the major party and--up to a point--for the second party.

It would be hypocritical, however, to assert that the honesty of this system is also extended to the other parties; and I think the following comment by KKE Secretary General Khar. Florakis--a comment which apparently was made only for humor--is pertinent and corresponds to facts: "They tell us that we too can taste the soup from the second distribution with a toothpick while they serve themselves with a cook's ladle!"

Correct as it was, the Florakis comment was also somewhat exaggerated. The draft law does not provide KKE with a toothpick, but with a teaspoon so it could win two-three Vouli seats and thus forget the bitter medicine the KKE followers were given by their unfaithful PASOK comrades.

The question arises: Was this honest system--to the extent that it is--politically well judged? It is apparent that the government and the major opposition pursued the same goal: to win a clear majority. And it is rare that government and the opposition should seek the same goal--after or without handshakes--that it created general jubilation and the acceptance, in principle, of the government draft law by the major opposition was applauded.

It appears that the political goal of winning a clear majority is sacred. Thus, the followers of the two parties--who constitute the immense majority of the Greek people--were willing to give due respect to the electoral draft law which guarantees that, following the next elections, one of the two parties will have a majority of the votes and will, therefore, be in a position to form a government with persons of similar political persuasions.

From this point of view, it could be said that the proposed draft law provides for an electoral system which assures a majority of votes to a party and the formation of non-coalition governments.

Such majorities and such governments were also produced by the existing system of reinforced proportional. But the government felt--and justly so--that the system became deficient and no longer provided for majorities. Why? Because the reinforced proportional results in a clear-cut majority when the difference in votes between the first and second party is large. However, the difference between PASOK and ND in the Euroelections was small...

Another condition for the reinforced proportional to be efficient is to enable only two parties to participate in the second distribution of Vouli seats provided they receive more than 17 percent of the votes. And it would be possible in the next elections--with the shift of votes from PASOK to the Left and the possible decision of certain independent voters to march under the KKE banner of opportunity--to have a "mini" popular front established which would succeed in gathering 17 percent of the votes.

It is for these two reasons--but mainly because it was ascertained that the difference between the two major parties was small--that the reinforced proportional system was abandoned and the draft law which sanctions the "super reinforced proportional" system was invented. But in my opinion this system should be called "the system of the first party."

It all depends on which party will come first--which party, that is, will have first preference in the distribution of the Vouli seats. This party has also first preference--with the help of the votes of the first distribution, more so in the second distribution, and continues to be first in the third distribution and in the process receives a good "bonus".

The difference between the first and second party may be insignificant in the first distribution but it becomes disproportionately larger in the second distribution and assumes an unreasonably gigantic dimension in the third.

The question is: why does not either of the two large parties protest? It does not, because in our glorious country both parties feel, first, that it must conduct politics as such and brand as a dangerous defeatist any politician or journalist who would dare insinuate that besides the first position there is a second one...

Of course, I am not about to spoil the cheerfulness of the staffs of the two major parties and to spoil their optimism. I feel that if either of the two large parties can come first, it will enjoy a majority and will form a government with members of similar persuasions.

But if we consider the Euroelection figures and increase or decrease them slightly, we will conclude that the two large parties today have about the same electoral strength. Is such a hypothesis illogical? Certainly not.

Then let me ask the staffs of the two parties: Do you understand the dangers this preposterously privileged position of the major party creates at a time when the two suitors of "first place" have about the same strength? Do you understand how many struggles--and what kind of struggles--will take place in order to achieve first place from which everything will depend? Do you understand what is about to take place in a country where--unfortunately--the electoral success or failure has again become a matter of life or death?

I express my own personal opinions which bind no one. I feel we live at a time of great political responsibility, a time which dictates that we all take into account our responsibilities. As journalists we are not irresponsible. And as a regular columnist of this magazine I feel obligated to express my viewpoint in time. It is futile to justify a posteriori to a responsible person on the results of a political postmortem.

Therefore, I ask all responsible persons: Under the acute conditions we live nowadays, is it wise to use an electoral system which stirs up the feelings of the two gladiators which play with victory and defeat? And how far is victory from defeat? Is it by one percent, by two percent or even by three percent of the total votes?

I think the reinforced proportional is the ultimate concession we could make today in order to maintain the precious system of the two major parties which take turns in governing. The super-reinforced proportional or rather the system of the ruling party's omnipotence as sanctioned by the new electoral system is, under the present political conditions, a dangerous political mistake because it stirs up all of us and impels us to achieve, in any way possible, the one, or the half percent of the vote percentage which separates victory from defeat...

But what if the reinforced proportional did not result in a comfortable majority for one of the two parties? I do not overlook the importance of absolute majority and the advantages of a government composed of party followers. Also, I do not ignore the importance of government stability, but I believe that today's demand--satisfaction of which must take priority--is to overcome discord and a threatening disunity.

Moreover, I find expedient to note that government stability is not the same as political stability--or, at least are not always identical. Italy lives under continuous government crises and represents an extreme case of a country having government instability. Yet, Italy has political stability in the sense that the system of government is implemented in an exemplary way. Everyone obeys the rules of the political game and public life rolls normally.

I may add that in the country neighboring it, the government is unstable but the relations between the various parties are good not because the party

leaderships are well intentioned--this may be so, of course--but mainly because the parties are forced every now and then to cooperate.

My views should not be misinterpreted. The government of majority with members of the same political persuasion constitute logical and legitimate goals. But it always pays to keep in mind the cost of achieving such goals. I fear that what we are asked to pay this time is more than we can afford. We cannot endure a greater disunity. The electoral system we adopted does not serve normality.

I pray I am wrong. But, in conclusion, let me ask: Is the possibility of forming, albeit for awhile, a government of cooperation so terrible and so revolting as to entrust this possibility and to pay any price so it may not happen?

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POLITICAL

GREECE

GOVERNMENT SEEN RESORTING TO PERSONALITY CULT

Athens I KATHIMERINI in Greek 3-4 Feb 85 p 4

/Article by Khr. Karanikas/

/Excerpts/ As Kastri /reference to prime minister's residence/ notices that the ground is sinking beneath its feet it is engaging in a systematic cultivation of a leadership mentality with Third World extensions. The disorientation of public opinion from vital problems, national, social and economic, is reduced to a scientific method by promoting the principle "bread and circuses." The conversion of the Greek republic to a personality cult regime is not so easy a matter nor has anyone succeeded in doing so over the long history of this country despite the fact that very many had longed for the glory of other alter egos in other countries and in other times. Under the surface, the reactions of the simple man in the coffee house or the street are healthy ones based on the defense of our democratic institutions.

Peace conferences are in the least convincing. The goal of the government that aimed at disorienting public opinion after the negative acceptance of the electoral law and the intense intra-party opposition over the abolition of the electoral preference cross as well as the renewal of the term of office of President K. Karamanlis does not appear to have succeeded. Warnings to Kastri are constantly coming in from many sides and with varying intensity. But it is a "voice crying in the wilderness." Up there they look at only state television and they read only the pro-government press.

Such a projection of the leader has another aim: the cultivation of a picture of an international leader who, of course, is not dependent on anyone, above all on the president of the republic. In this way, they believe that they can make up for any impressions that had been created at the time of the announcement of the electoral law or that might crop up as to Karamanlis' new election by the present Chamber of Deputies. The moves are well-studied and have a dual aim: to convince those who are still wavering that the leader has such international stature that they will forget all the other problems and to stress the moral aspect to those who are loyal and to inspire them to new "struggles."

The buildup of the personality cult is being mounted with all of the potential of Kastri and its entourage. The insistence on the abolition of the electoral preference cross aims at exactly this purpose and for accomplishing this all means are to be



utilized. Of course, it remains to be seen how far this gets vis-a-vis the cold reality of the country, something quite difficult if we are to judge from the reactions of the populace so far. There is also the problem of institutions, the dangers that involve democracy through the abolition of the electoral preference cross and the hierachization of candidates in lists located down in the closed basement of Kastri. In the long run, the deputy is no longer dependent on the people who voted for him but on the entourage of the leader, to the camarilla that is returning surreptitiously to the country with all its consequences.

The problem, however, is shifting for Kastri itself and goes back to what extent this tactic can serve its political goals. To disorient public opinion, to put a stop to opposition within PASOK, to disorganize adversary parties, to hold on to voters and to continue the tacts of the two fronts. Those extra-parliamentary chosen ones who are to replace those whom the people chose in the previous elections, how will they be able to bring the dialogue down to the grassroots? The Gordian knot for the government party lies here and it is perhaps for that reason that it is employing methods for undermining its opponents.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

'INFORMER' AMONG HIGHER ND OFFICIALS SUSPECTED OF LEAKS

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 24-31 Jan 85 pp 14-15

/Excerpts/ Who is the unknown "X" in ND who is channeling to its opponents information that concerns it and also documents that are sometimes secret?

Who provides detailed information even to the most trusted leadership organs? Or is the major government opposition party in what can be described as a Greek Watergate?

The issue cropped up again with the leak to a pro-government newspaper of what was up to then a top secret ND ideological manifesto. This has been and still is of concern to the party. At the same time, intense activities are being undertaken to locate the one or more persons suspected of leaking the information.

The party president himself allegedly stated, "It is morally unacceptable that such documents should be channeled to the opposition press."

This whole story of leaks has caused concern in the party because this case has not been the first nor the last. Many provocative previous cases had occurred from the time when Georgios Rallis was in office while they continued under Averof. Of course, they have not stopped even under Mitsotakis.

The conviction is now widespread that "we cannot even indulge in a conversation" without fearing the danger of a leak. This danger exists not at the lower party levels where there has been almost no case of a leak. Such leaks usually occur either at meetings of the parliamentary group or even at meetings of the political office that is made up of very few members. This latter body is the highest collective body that is exactly right beside the party leader.

Surprised deputies and cadres read in pro-PASOK newspapers about "minutes" of what occurred or was discussed at the political office, what opinions were expressed or who agreed or disagreed with whom, without their having been officially briefed through normal party channels.

While deputies and cadres realize that this situation cannot continue, neither the leadership nor the political office have shown that they share their indignation and rage.

The questions and the leak suspects --certain ones have been "spotted" from the Rallis era-- demand an answer: what and whose game are they playing? Why have they chosen this particular time when the presidential election campaign is beginning?

As a common demand the traitor must at once "be decapitated." He is either a former minister or a deputy. His immediate purge from the party is the only punishment that fits the crime.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL 'COMPROMISE' REVEALED

Athens POLITIKA THEMATA in Greek 18-24 Jan 85 p 10

/Text/ Behind the scenes of the "historic compromise" President Konst. Karamanlis achieved with Premier Papandreou with regard to the new electoral law, it appears that, according to reliable sources, certain other developments were also agreed upon. Well, no general elections will take place before the election of the president of the Republic. Therefore, the will of Karamanlis prevailed since he wanted the president to be elected by the present Vouli and the existing correlation of the political forces in that body.

But if no one doubts that the general elections cannot take place before the president's election, then no one can maintain that without fail the upcoming general elections will take place in October as the government publicly claims.

It is said that the historic compromise also includes the agreement that in the event that neither PASOK nor ND win a majority in the next general elections, the two parties will try to find a solution (for the formation of a government) without the "appendage" of any third party. It was easier to accomplish this significant agreement now while PASOK and its leadership are still up in the air, far from reality.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

TSOKHATZOPOULOS, ARSENIS GROUPS CLASH IN GSEE

Athens ENA in Greek 24 Jan 85 p 16

/Text/ The tension in the upper PASOK and government echelons continues to dominate as the rivalry for the control and guidance of the syndicalist movement is accentuated.

The "Arsenis group" appears to gain the upper hand at the expense of the "Tsokhatzopoulos group" to which G. Raftopoulos, the president of the Greek General Confederation of Labor /GSEE/ belongs. The Arsenis group came into existence recently as a counterweight to A. Tsokhatzopoulos who is the party's official responsible for unionism.

The Arsenis group includes all cadres of PASOK's Panhellenic Militant Workers Trade Union Movement /PASKE/ who are members of the GSEE administration and who are opposing G. Raftopoulos and, by extension, A. Tsokhatzopoulos who, at the same time, has lost influence in the labor movement as a result of his assuming important initiatives in the Giannopoulos-Livanis-Katsanevas triangle whose objective is to stop any PASOK-KKE cooperation within GSEE.

This paragovernment group weakens and rejects the Tsokhatzopoulos vote within the party because, on the one hand, he continues to maintain the responsibility for the unionist movement and, on the other hand, he carries a burden within PASOK and the government for having supported cooperation with KKE in the GSEE administration--a cooperation which did not profit PASOK politically and has now become controversial as a result of the important KKE different views in the syndicalist area (income policy, for example) and in the political area as well (electoral law, for instance).

Already, the triangle, with the labor minister as spokesman, has started preparing for the rift with KKE with a steady flow of adverse reports and charges regarding the attitude KKE maintains as well as with the accusation that it applies "revolutionary gymnastics" in order to obstruct the government's work.

The Tsokhatzopoulos group feels the pressure from many sides because it must face, besides the "replacement" of its spokesman (Tsokhatzopoulos), the undermining of the newborn Arsenis group in which GSEE Organizational Secretary P. Spylopoulos plays a leading role. He is also the president of



the Greek Telecommunications union. This is one of the largest unions with 30,000 members.

The rallying of the anti-Tsokhatzopoulos syndicalist wing around Arsenis is also due to the fact that the minister of national economy appears to be well entrenched within the party and government and also he enjoys the premier's confidence. This gives his group the status of "legality" and limits any possibility of being accused as adopting a fractionist and anti-leadership attitude with all the disciplinary consequences such an attitude would entail for the group's members.

It appears that higher partisan echelons have detected the decrease in the Tsokhatzopoulos prestige within the PASOK syndicalist area and have authorized Arsenis to "assign" PASOK's income policy to the party's syndicalists.

This choice was made after it was ascertained that Arsenis can persuade the syndicalists to accept the income policy in contrast to Tsokhatzopoulos who, it was felt, does not have any more such possibilities since the "antipathies" he has created would make the syndicalists reject without question his suggestions and orders as was the case in the past.

Indeed, at a meeting of PASOK unionists held at the Park Hotel, G. Arsenis "did very well" and appears to have persuaded the unionists to accept the government view on the income policy and, in general, the claims of the working people.

At the present phase, the interests of the Giannopoulos-Livanis-Katsanevas triangle as these interests concern the rift of cooperation with KKE, coincide with the targets of the Arsenis group which, for its own reasons, intensifies its pressure for the restructure of the GSEE presidium and the weakening of its support by party members and unionists.

Of course, as things have developed, the PASOK-KKE tensions with regard to the income policy and the electoral system do not allow for margins for the Tsokhatzopoulos group to support PASOK-KKE cooperation and he appears to accept PASOK's course for a rift with KKE. This coincidence, however, is opportunistic and does not mean that there are possibilities for future cooperation between the two groups unless one of them submits to the other or unless higher party echelons intervene and restore such cooperation, especially in view of the forthcoming elections.

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POLITICAL

GREECE

REACTION TO PASOK ND ELECTORAL 'CONSENSUS'

Athens ANDI in Greek 18 Jan 85 p 3

/Editorial: "But Who Are Consenting?"

/Text/ "Consent" appears at first to be a linguistic upgrading of the "mild climate." However, what the proposal for a "mild climate" intended to achieve in the symbolic field of politics now surfaces as an "obligation" in the field of reality. Consent now is but another word for state "co-management". It is not the result of a PASOK-ND relation. It is symbolically reflected in the PASOK-Karamanlis relation.

It is natural that this consent should be hatched in the Karamanlis ante-room since everyone knows the president's "special role" does not derive from any personal favor nor from the authority of his office but from the fact that he represents something more than the de facto leader of the Right; it represents a symbol of the bourgeoisie's political unity as it was restored in the famous "post-dictatorship framework."

Therefore, if one is about to accept reconciliation, he will not deal with officials of lower rank, but will do so directly with the "adversary's" center of power. This is exactly what happened with the electoral law and its solemnization (it was given to the president before it was presented to the Chamber of Deputies and to the other parties) as well as with the "small gifts" which were exchanged afterwards as, for instance, the overt intervention of Karamanlis in the judiciary.

Of course, for a contradictory party like PASOK, this apparent "shift" does not mean it will avoid tension "surprises" in the "purely" political field for two reasons: first, because the main PASOK incentive of such "accommodations" is to make sure it remains in power by any means and, second, it wants to stay in power with a majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, it will be in conflict with both ND and the Left.

It must be made clear that PASOK lacks reserves of any kind for a real conflict because for 3 years now it has failed to establish social fronts of change which would ensure it a broad support based not on the abstract concept of the "popular rank and file" but on the specific concept of popular benefits which are the result of a policy.

Therefore, rhetorical clashes, which in practice will be realized only through state means, would create a polarization in an area where even PASOK's electoral efficiency would be doubtful. There is, then, an urgent need for a policy corresponding--by definition at least--to a large extent to the Left which, undoubtedly, is also responsible for all that PASOK did (and the Left failed to avert them) and for all that PASOK could do (but the Left failed to oppose them on it).

Naturally, this "other" policy could not be a micrographic repetition of the 1974-81 policy--the policy, that is, of an oppositionist, bureaucratic verbalism which simply reproduces and rewards social stagnation.

There is need for the Left's presence as such presence is documented by its social substance rather than by its political perfection. We have already experienced this association and we have paid dearly.

7520

CSO: 3521/154

POLITICAL

GREECE

PASOK-ND BATTLEFIELD: CENTER OF POLITICAL SPECTRUM

Athens ENA in Greek 24 Jan 85 p 17

/Article by P. Bakogiannis: "1985 Elections: A Change of Change"

/Text/ The developments already scheduled by the political parties will influence the country's political life during the 90's and will bear the stamp of a leadership which lived through the Civil War and World War II.

The interactions taking place in the area of political force make it evident that we are methodically led to a substantial change of the country's political scene. On the one hand the electoral system the government announced certifies the plan's main choices and parameters and on the other hand provides the convenient motive to bypass the stage of such interactions and to reach the final stage for shaping the main plan: to size up resistances, gains and losses.

The great battle between the two large parties will apparently concern the claim of the centrist area which will no longer exist as a partisan or ideological area. It will be a "pool" from which votes will be tapped and which disenchanted voters will join. Thus, the central area will become a field of spectacular clashes among the large parties, a fact which will entail critical and intertime effects on the ideological character of the two large parties competing for it. Thus, the margin of thievery to the left of the one or to the right of the other is delineated indirectly but clearly and, naturally, is at the same time becoming minimal.

Therefore, in order to be able to draw a significant percentage of votes from the centrist pool, ND must convincingly appeal to the Right. Despite its negative openings to this area in 1981 and 1984 and despite the fact that today also there are cadres who are interested in similar openings, this development is due to the phenomena of stagnancy and is becoming degenerated. Moreover, the consequences of such a myopic concept are decisive since the votes of the centrist pool are doubly detrimental when they are taken from ND and given to PASOK. Therefore, two centro-rightist votes are needed to neutralize one centrist. Of course, the same is true for PASOK--two leftist votes are needed for each centrist vote it loses since such a vote will definitely be given to ND.

In perspective, moreover, in its present form the extreme Right will continue to degenerate and, at most, will become a force not to be reckoned with. Such a development cannot be at the expense of PASOK and of the communist Left in general. The KKE-PASOK idyll is ended. PASOK has definitely chosen its policy. It abandoned its pre-election slogan, "Never again the Right." Theoretically, with the simple proportional electoral system, PASOK could form a coalition government with the extreme Left even if it were a second (after ND) party. It could be so much easier with the new electoral system since ND contests first place on equal terms. Therefore, the government's choice is more ideological than electoral.

We conclude, therefore, that the two large parties will extend their suzerainty to the area farther to the right of the two communist parties, an area of completely different persuasions whose only common points of contact, and of collision as well, are the conflicting boundaries of PASOK and ND. The lack of strong class characteristics in the modern Greek society and the traditionally increasing social movability which has been ideologicalized, contribute to the broadening of this area and to the possibility of its population being increased as we move away from the origins of our historically but not socially defined party association.

The communist Left is marginized not only on the basis of choices of its "bourgeois" adversaries, but by its every inherent traits which prevent it from reactions decisively to the plans of its "marginization" and determine its future course. The KKE slogans such as "fellow travelers of the Right" and other similar ones cannot find a broader appeal no matter how much they express the anger and despair of the PASOK people who have ruled for 3 critical years.

The fact that for 17 years KKE-Int. has experienced an uncertainty bespeaks KKE's weakness to be in contact with its more kindred forces. Therefore, its percentage, which fluctuates around 10 percent, is not dynamic. It is not like PASOK's 13 percent in 1974 but a historical remnant which profits from KKE. The leftist noose around it effectively prevents the increase of the KKE forces and the effect of its break up is not clearly defined as far as this remnant is concerned. The two leftist parties will continually be in this unique situation of "siege".

Thus, what appears today as an attack against PASOK is in fact a defense KKE must assume in order to maintain its strength at the present level because regardless of the Florakis oratorical volleys against PASOK, the voters in the periphery of the noose will show their preference for PASOK as the lesser of two evils. Therefore, a PASOK-KKE confrontation cannot adversely affect PASOK in the near future, while in the distant future KKE may perhaps become a historical fossil.

On the contrary, KKE-Int. may profit from such a confrontation and for this reason they will become a double PASOK target: to attack it but also to try



to win it over. The loose relations KKE-Int has with the voters who necessarily are not its followers makes things easier.

With these givens, the plan will be put in operation in the immediate and perceptible future especially since a pool for accepting leftist radicalized persons does not exist and no preconditions for establishing such a pool seem to come into view.

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CS0: 3521/154

POLITICAL

ITALY

## STUDY ON PCI MEMBERSHIP

Rome L'UNITA in Italian 20 Jan 85 pp 10-11

[Article by Fausto Ibba: "How Are the Communists Doing?"]

[Text] This is how the computer sees them, in the data gathered by the electronic brain on the Via delle Botteghe Oscure. Against a backdrop of crisis involving both the party's performance as representative and even its "morality," the PCI finds itself still a major organized force: 1,619,035 card-carrying members in 1984, and more than a million have already picked up their cards for 1985.

The PCI moves toward the crucial political elections of 1985 with 1,619,035 active members. This was the figure of record as of the end of October, the official expiration date for 1984 cards. By the first week of January more than a million members had renewed their cards for 1985: that is about 62 percent, a proportion higher than that for the same period in 1984.


These data reflect the solidity of the PCI's organized strength, an "anomalous" phenomenon among Italian political parties, but certainly one that is hard to class among the mere residues of an outdated tradition. One need merely reflect that this resurgence has come about in the context of a national crisis, which weighs heavily on the representational ability of the political parties and their "morality," giving rise to indiscriminate mistrust of politics.

The PCI's deep roots in the electorate are once again confirmed by the numbers.

The question now is: what trend-lines emerge from a more detailed analysis of those numbers?

The computerized membership profiles kept at the Botteghe Oscure, still in the breaking-in stages over the past several years, are

Fig.1 MEMBERSHIP IN SOME MAJOR FEDERATIONS: MEN/WOMEN



Key: Dark bars = men  
Light bars = women

Ordinates show % levels by sex  
Abscissa shows figures by sex  
for Rome, Milan, Naples, Turin,  
Genoa, Bologna, and Florence.

The scope of the decline in party membership over the span of 7 years portends problems in a difficult replacement process.

Young people between the ages of 18 and 24 account for only 3 percent of the party ranks. A lot of us are in our thirties, and even more of us are in the senior-citizen class.

The female contingent of the membership, however, is apparently immune to this erosion.

now capable of gathering and updating most of the data received on party members. This amounts to a kind of yearly census which will gradually open the way to increasingly penetrating comparisons, providing an invaluable data-base for political cogitation on ways to bring new blood into the party and its organization.

The 1984 "books" have only just been closed, and that puts us in a position to make an educated guess about the more significant data provided by the computer, which has digested the profiles of a million and a half members as of last year.

As we have already reported, the overall number of members issued cards as of the end of October was 1,619,035. That is about 16,000 members less than in 1983: 430,070 of them are women, who numbered 431,830 in 1983. A slight difference, which brings their percentage of the total membership from 26.4 to 28.5 percent.

The "recruits," newly enrolled members, in 1984 numbered 62,563, or 3.86 percent of the total: not enough, when you allow for the fact that the necessary percentage to make up for what are considered "physiological" losses is something like 5 percent for a mass party like ours.

However, if we are to get a better estimate of the 1984 record, as part of the trend for the last 5 years, we have to step back a pace.

The party's organized strength sank to its postwar nadir in 1968, with only 1.5 million members. In 1971 we saw the first signs of recovery, with a gain of some 20,000 members. The first real spurt, though, came in 1972, with an influx of more than 60,000 new members. Most of them were students and unskilled workers who had gone through the experience of great mass movements in 1968 and 1969.

Growth is still more marked in the years that followed, and it coincides with the 1974 battle over divorce and the victories at the polls in 1975 and 1976. The peak came in 1976, when there were 1,814,317 members: a leap of 85,000 card-carrying members in a single year.

In 1970, this imposing strength held fast. Beginning in 1978, however, the trend turned around. Clearly, this coincided with the problems encountered in the national solidarity policy, but it also came along with the party's travail in the process of abandoning that policy.

Between 1978 and 1984 the PCI lost about 200,000 members, or 11 percent of total enrollment.

There was, however, a drift that perhaps was not thoroughly analyzed, even though it is difficult to isolate the specific key factors for any given year. The fact remains that in 1978 we lost

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Table 1: PCI'S SOCIAL MAKEUP

(in percentages of 1984 Membership)

Unskilled workers	38.69
Farm laborers	4.04
Independent farmers	2.42
Tenant farmers	0.50
Merchants and shopkeepers	2.80
Crafts and tradesmen	5.66
Small businessmen	0.83
Office workers	3.84
Technical workers	3.23
Teachers	1.70
Self-employed professionals	0.97
Workers at home	0.77
Housewives	7.57
Pensioners	20.97
Students	1.05
Other	4.81

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Table 2: EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MEMBERS

	National Total	North	South
Elementary grades	62.09	64.20	53.50
Junior high school	20.97	20.50	22.62
Senior high school	9.89	8.19	15.28
College degree	2.82	1.98	5.13
No certificate of completion	4.23	5.13	3.41

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about 24,000 members; in 1979 we lost 31,000, but in 1980 we lost only 8,000. It looked very much as though we had reached a point of stabilization, but, on the contrary, 1981 brought yet another loss of 35,000, and in 1982 the losses climbed to no less than 41,000 members, the biggest loss in 7 years. In 1983, the decline was 38,000. In 1984, as we noted, it dropped to 16,000. In other words, the bleeding had been stanchied, but there was no real turnaround in the trend, notwithstanding the fact that 1984 was remarkable for that spring's massive protests against the escalator-clause decree, and our extraordinary victory in the European elections.

One of the more significant data, as we noted earlier, has to do with communist women. The decline in membership over the last 7 years has not substantially affected the strength of the feminine presence in the party: 435,438 of them were members in 1976, and the numbers have continued to grow, albeit by a few thousands, in the years that followed -- counter to the overall trend -- until in 1981 they numbered about 441,000. Even so, the 1984 decline, by comparison with 1986, was only 5,000.

If we move on now to the social makeup of the party, we find no major changes. The dominant group is still composed of unskilled workers, although their ranks are thinning.

In 1984, the unskilled workers accounted for 38.6 percent, but their share in 1983 was 39.4 percent, and in 1982 it was 40.1 percent. This finding is fairly even nationwide, even though of course there are variations from one region to another. We must point out, however, that the "unskilled worker" category embraces far more than permanently employed workers, and reaches much further than wage-earning workers in industry. It will take far more closely focused computer studies, using cross-comparisons, to break down this broad, general datum and come up with more specific information.

With this caveat in mind, it should be said that the highest overall percentage of unskilled workers is found in Campania: 49.6 percent: a very high rate, even allowing for the influx of industry there over the past 15 years. Lombardy is in second place, with 46.4 percent, following the Veneto with 45.4 percent, Piedmont and Sardinia, with 44.9 percent each. The lowest percentage of the unskilled is found in Sicily, with 20.3 percent employed.

As we have already noted, the variations from 1983 are all but imperceptible, even though they certainly do not seem to be moving in the same direction as the shifts under way in society as a whole. Farm employment is up from 3.6 to 4 percent. Independent farmers are holding at 2.4 percent. Small merchants, with 2.8 percent, are up by 2.8 percent. Independent craftsmen and tradesmen held steady at 5.6 percent. Office workers were down from 4.1 to 3.8 percent, and technicians from 3.4 to 3.2 percent. Teachers

Fig. 2 PCI MEMBERS JOINING SINCE 1968




Table 3 : PARTY MEMBERSHIP BY YEAR OF ENROLLMENT

Years	Percentages
1921-1945	16.70
1946-1953	16.17
1954-1960	8.10
1961-1968	8.48
1969-1974	14.95
1975-1979	18.44
1980-1983	14.15
1984	2.05

held their ground at 1.7 percent. Pensioners, with 20.9 percent, had increased by 0.7 percent. These shifts are so slight as to be impatient of interpretation in terms of trends. In any case, they underscore the need for a timely restoration of balance in the party's social mix and hence consistency with that goal in the next membership drive. The severe problem of the young is reflected in the raw computer figures. The average age of our members is 49: it ranges from 43 in Campania to 46 in the Abruzzo, from 48 in Lombardy and Piedmont to 51 in Emilia and up to 52 in Liguria. Of course, we must remember that these variations reflect the variations in average age of the several populations. The Mezzogiorno, as we all know, is markedly "younger" than the rest of the country.

The datum most significant from the political point of view, however, has to do with the party's share of the upcoming generations. The membership share of members between 18 and 24 years of age is 3.19 percent. By way of reference, we would remind readers that, according to a recent poll, membership of young people in this age bracket in political and labor organizations is around 3 percent in Italy. The PCI is thus not far from that average level -- provided, of course, we do not count the young members of the FGCI.

Within this national total of 1.19 percent there are some marked differences. First of all, the percentage in the north is 2.6 percent, whereas in the Mezzogiorno it is 4.8 percent.

What is the disparity with respect to the young in the country at large?

On the basis of the 1981 census we can assume that the 18-to-24 age-group in Italy includes 14.5 percent of the population: about 13 percent in the north and 17 percent in the Mezzogiorno. These figures show how "under-represented" the upcoming generation is in the party. There are, for instance, regions like Liguria and Emilia, where members over 80 are more numerous than those between 18 and 24, whereas in Tuscany their numbers are equal.

This generational gap crops up again, in fact, among the older comrades. Members over 60 account for about 28 percent, whereas the same age-groups make up around 24 percent of the national population.

To provide a more accurate picture of the situation, we can say that for every 100 members over 60 there are 11 between 18 and 24. In Campania, for every 100 over 60, there are 36 between 18 and 24, but in Emilia there are only 7.

These figures, however, reflect internal party balances, and certainly cannot be used to measure its respective influence on the younger generations.

Perhaps an example will help to clear up any misunderstanding. The prize for "youngest" party might, in a way, go to Molise, where 7 percent of the membership is between 18 and 24, the highest of all the regions. That percentage in Emilia is 2.6 percent. In Molise,

though, party members number only 4,500, or 1.4 percent of the population, whereas in Emilia they are about 425,000, or 10.8 percent of the population. And not only is Molise an extreme example because the ratio of membership to population in the southern regions ranges from 1.3 percent in Sicily to 1.5 percent in Campania, and from 1.8 in Calabria to 2.2 in Sardinia.

However, though the soft point is the shortage of members from the 18-to-24 group, the picture changes with the generations. The biggest share of party membership belongs to members in the "active" age-group, those between 25 and 60. Younger members between 25 and 30 are more than 7 percent. There is a modest gap between them and the overall population of the same age (9 percent or so).

The most numerous segment consists today of members between 30 and 40: 22 percent. A higher percentage than that of the population of the same age (about 18 percent). Members between 40 and 50 account for 19.7 percent (18.2 percent of the total age-group). Lastly, those between 50 and 60 can claim a 20.3-percent share, though in the population as a whole they make up only 17 percent.

The trend in the overall membership of the PCI over recent years and the ratios from one generation of communists to another fit fairly well with the figures on seniority of party membership. The internal shifts, however, are not so linear as they might appear at first glance, even though the high points of party membership gains coincide with certain salient points in the nation's political experience.

By now, the majority of the party's membership joined the PCI after 1969. The biggest group (18.4 percent) joined between 1975 and 1979: one need only recall that in 1979 there were about 180,000 "recruits." Members who joined during the sixties account for around 15 percent.

The Resistance generation, though, still carries considerable weight. Those who joined the party prior to 1946 account for 16.7 percent of total membership.

Another figure might prove surprising. Members who joined between 1980 and 1984 number 17 percent, or around 270,000. Since, over that same 5-year period we lost a total of 138,000 members, that means that actually some 400,000 comrades (including those who died) did not renew their party cards. It would be mistaken, therefore, to believe that the PCI is a non-mobile body, subject of recent years to steady erosion and inexorable senility. The fact is that the party has continued to exert a strong ability to attract members, but it has not always managed to keep its newest recruits. Here you see the signs of a vitality often affected by complicated political stress. We must also ask ourselves whether this very intense shifting, this continual coming and going, may not be a symptom of the persistent difficulties besetting our party's organizations as they try to channel energy, to provide a concrete

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Tab. 3 : AGE BRACKETS FOR PROVINCIAL PARTY COMMITTEE MEMBERS\*

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25 and under	5.67
26 to 30	17.91
31 to 40	41.66
41 to 50	16.54
51 to 60	10.20
60 and over	3.05
Not recorded	4.97

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\* Average is 37, as compared with average membership age of 49.

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Here you see the signs of true vitality, albeit often adversely affected by complicated political stresses. We must also ask ourselves whether this intensive shifting, this continual coming and going, might not be symptomatic of the persistent difficulties besetting our Party's organizations as they try to channel energy, to provide a concrete meaning and direction to active political participation. Here, though, we are getting into questions the computer is not yet capable of answering.

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CS0: 3528/27



POLITICAL

NETHERLANDS

BASIC RETHINKING OF TIES WITH ARUBA, CURACAO NEEDED

Rotterdam NRC HANDELSBLAD in Dutch 12 Jan 85 p 9

[Article by Christiaan van Krimpen, Head of the Aruban Port Authority and former member of the Senate for the Labor Party: "Without a Thorough Revision of its Relationship with the Netherlands, Aruba Is Headed for Irrevocable Ruin"]

[Text] The situation in Aruba after the closing of the refinery is potentially a very dangerous one. Without an extensive aid program, the economy of the island will completely crumble by the middle of 1985, with all the attendant consequences.

The great question is to what extent the loud declarations of solidarity coming out of Venezuela will ultimately result in concrete actions. And it is already most unlikely that America will offer any help. After all, President Reagan has no need for a new problem area in his own back yard. On the other hand, intervention in the affairs of a private industry is diametrically opposed to his whole economic policy. And the Netherlands, through its spokesman, Minister De Koning, has let it be known--with the RSV [Rijn-Scheld Verolme (shipbuilding firm)] affair still fresh in people's minds--that it does not want to pour any money into a bottomless pit. So good advice is also expensive.

The Netherlands will really not be able to get out of standing by to aid this segment of the kingdom. And this is true, moreover, not only for Aruba but also for Curacao, where the closing of the Shell refinery hangs above the horizon like a dark cloud.

Hard-fisted reorganization measures will be necessary on the short term. And they will doubtless cause tensions of a social nature. Since the thirties, the Aruban has always had it good, and this prosperity, especially in the last decade, has had a number of negative effects. Government machinery expanded vigorously through political appointments, while the quality of government services deteriorated. The attitude of many employees grew worse. Social allocations improved so much in the government sector, however, that they were in many respects themselves higher than those of the mother country. Industry made great strides, and the wage level rose to heretofore unknown heights. These factors contributed to a situation wherein the island was completely out of step with its neighbors.

So adjusting to the hard facts of current economic reality will also be that much more difficult. The fact that no aid is forthcoming will undoubtedly prompt wholesale emigration to the Netherlands; and although many Arubans, because of negative press reports, feel ill-disposed toward leaving Aruba for the motherland, this may indeed be their only outlet.

Politically, too, the Netherlands is in a less enviable position. Because of the Statute for the Kingdom, the motherland is also responsible for the quality of administration in this overseas territory. In practice, this provision is a farce. The Antilles are autonomous, and every Dutch intervention is quickly labeled a colonialist action. However, both the US and Venezuela expect the Netherlands to take measures to prevent the occurrence of such a situation as now exists in Surinam or Grenada. Venezuela tolerates the Dutch flag on the "shoal islands" just off its coast, but will intervene at the first sign of political instability, no doubt with the full approval of Washington. The unavoidable conclusion, therefore, is that the Netherlands cannot get out of standing by with aid in this situation, for various reasons.

The relatively large-scale aid that will be needed in coming years to prevent Aruba as well as Curacao from going under economically, embraces the need for a fundamental change in the whole relationship between the Netherlands and the Antilles. The Dutch policy of development in the last decade has been directed toward thrusting this last royal overseas territory away from itself. The process is naturally justified by referring to the sacred duty of every self-respecting people to lead its former colonies to constitutional independence. The arrow of independence came out of the Dutch political quiver; and after a great deal of talk back and forth, the year 1996 was assigned to Aruba as its independence date, as part of a package deal at the time of the Round Table Conference (RTC).

The ultimate result of all these well-intentioned Dutch efforts is a disintegration process in the Antilles and a wholesale refusal to respect the RTC agreements. And now finally, one year before the realization of separate status, the impending economic ruin of the two largest islands, Aruba and Curacao, looms on the horizon.

After the [Dutch East] Indies debacle, the Netherlands wanted to carry out a model decolonization policy, with large-scale development aid and autonomy within the kingdom, as the colony moved toward constitutional independence. The development policy that the Netherlands engineered was based chiefly on idealized motives. However, the reality did not fit Dutch missionary zeal, all intentions notwithstanding. By introducing the Statute in 1954, the Netherlands unwittingly hung a millstone around its own neck.

During the postwar years, in a flurry of "realpolitik," England made most of its Caribbean colonies independent. The smaller islands, in particular, without many means of subsistence, have not come off very well, but England no longer has the burden of supporting them. The Statute, however, provided for more and more relations of dependence between the Netherlands and the former colony of Curacao. The chances of success that any efforts to give constitutional independence to the Antilles would have is minimal. The economic base must first be reconstructed before thoughts of constitutional independence can ever again be entertained.

The political dilemma, however, is a life-sized one. Aid, particularly in the sense of budget aid (covering the shortcomings in the island administration), creates an entirely new dependence on The Hague. The islands are becoming, in a sense, "article 12 communities." For budget aid will have to be accompanied by heavy restrictions in the reorganization of government finances. That means encroaching upon the autonomy of the Antillean administration. It looks, however, as if no alternative exists; the Netherlands is now doing within the kingdom the same thing the IMF is accustomed to do internationally. People take advantage of him who is too good-natured.

There is also another problem, however. The bond with the Netherlands is becoming weaker and weaker. Dutch has not been a living language there now for a long time, although it is still compulsory in schools and within the government. The anti-Dutch feeling is especially noticeable in Curacao. The legal position of European Netherlands is worse than that of the Turkish guest-workers in the Netherlands. Most Dutch development workers return to the mother country in frustration after completing their tour of duty. Dutch police officers are the victims of plain and simple harassment.

So it is time that the relations with the kingdom be organized along somewhat more realistic lines. In this respect, the starting point should be that the islands themselves determine whether, and if yes, when, they want to terminate their ties with the Netherlands. But the other side of the coin must be that people choose the relationship with the Netherlands of their own free will, and not from any negative point of view.

Perhaps, however, a more realistic alternative would be an economic, and later also a constitutional, integration with Venezuela. A rapid dissolution of the bond with the kingdom, coupled with a generous financial settlement might then become necessary as well, and a new round table conference, with Venezuela as the third negotiating partner.

As things are going now, the situation really cannot endure much longer.

8117

CSO: 3614/55

POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# IMPORTATION OF FOODSTUFFS LEADS TO NATIONAL DEPENDENCE

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 9 Jan 85 p 6

[Editorial: "Depending on Others"]

[Text] We produce poorly and we eat worse. This, in general terms, could be the conclusion to be drawn from the seminar held by the National Defense Auditors Association on the Portuguese food problem. Moreover, we have come to such a state that if the disaster of 1580 were to be repeated and we were to suffer the loss of national independence again, it would very probably happen, not because of historical or dynastic reasons as happened then, nor because of an enemy army crossing the borders, and like the Hitler forces in Paris in 1940, installing themselves in Lisbon. It would be much easier. It would be enough for our suppliers--in terms of food--to remember to cut off shipments or to simply use blackmail: The country as collateral.

Sixty percent of what we eat comes from abroad and it is unlikely that we could do without it, since the so-called basic food items are included in that very high percentage.

It is obvious--and perhaps that may serve us as some consolation--that we are not a unique case. In international terms, and according to revelations by the FAO, there is no country that is perfectly self-sufficient when it comes to food. Generally, in one way or another, all nations depend on two or three countries, with special prominence, naturally, on the United States.

In the specific case of our country, the association promoting that meeting does not hide its concerns in view of the well-known aggravation of the situation. Figures reveal that our dependence in that area has been intensifying in recent years, concluding by reaching almost alarming levels. More and more we are producing less of what we need to eat, and more and more we are mortgaging ourselves to the foreign supplier. That, in the understanding of our National Defense advisers is our greatest vulnerability. Generally and lightly speaking, it must be said that this is how they could vanquish and rule us, not exactly by the force of arms.

We are unanimous in recognizing that there is actually a need for establishing national food policy based on a number of sectoral policies, which deal with the reorganization of agriculture, a balanced use of our soil and with our maritime economic zone--of the richest on the entire European coast. The only thing is that such a basic policy, which is repeatedly called for, has been, on the other hand, successively postponed.

The truth is that the Portuguese eat poorly in two respects: poorly in terms of a rational nutrition--which they never followed even when they could eat well--and poorly because more and more our lack of money forces us to do so.

There is talk of our vulnerability as a result of the growing dependence we have been falling into in terms of food. Very well, if in a conventional war it is up to the generals to draft a strategy for insuring a desired defense, it is proper to demand that those who are responsible for the administration be responsible for the drafting of a plan for putting an end to that well-known vulnerability. In other words: The need for a food policy based on the resources of the country is recognized, which means in fact a solution for this growing problem. After all, as has just been demonstrated, this also affects national defense. What could we be waiting for?

8908

CSO: 3542/91



POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FIGURES: DETAILS ON FOREIGN DEBT

Lisbon TEMPO in Portuguese 11-17 Jan 85 p 11

[Text] At the end of the past year the Portuguese foreign debt reached \$15 to \$16 billion, which in Portuguese money means approximately 3 billion contos [as published]. Of this amount, nearly 21 percent belongs to the short-term debt, which is a significant improvement compared to 1983, when that component of our foreign debt was 33 percent of the total we owe abroad. Individually, each Portuguese owed approximately 300 contos to foreign lenders, which placed us among the first places at a world level.

Despite the fact that our foreign debt grew in absolute values, in per capita terms it improved significantly (as we have just seen), as well as in terms of scheduling among short, medium and long terms. This fact meant that Portugal managed to comply with its commitments with respect to the IMF, which cannot fail to be considered as very positive, particularly if we consider that we shall soon have a delegation from that international institute among us.

The Balance of Current Accounts was mainly responsible for the improvement now shown by the foreign debt. Thus, the deficit of this balance should be around \$700 million (1250 billion contos, according to negotiations with the IMF). This last amount represents 3 percent of the Gross Domestic Product.

Revenues from tourism, which improved by nearly 16 percent compared to 1983 (January to September), and remittances from emigrants (stagnation in dollars), can be indicated as being the main factors for the improvement in the foreign debt situation. Also responsible for the improvement in our foreign debt situation is the decline in economic activity resulting from the restrictive economic policy adopted in 1984. It led to a decline in imports and indirectly to a decline of nearly 20 percent in real investment.

With respect to 1985, Portugal should show a slight improvement in its economic activity. As a result, the deficit in the current accounts balance should increase, since an increase in imports and a reduction in the rate of growth in our exports will be seen.

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POLITICAL

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POLL ON PRESIDENTIAL PREFERENCE: PINTASILGO AHEAD

Lisbon O JORNAL in Portuguese 11-17 Jan 85 p 11

[Text] Engineer Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is the candidate the president of the republic should support in the presidential elections, according to a Marktest/O JORNAL survey made in November last year. In the total number of answers (spontaneous and prompted) the former prime minister was chosen 39 percent of the times, followed by Nobre da Costa with 11 percent, Mario Soares with 7 percent and Salgado Zenha with 6 percent.

Other names mentioned were those of Garcia dos Santos (4 percent), Alberto Joao Jardim (3 percent), Mota Amaral (3 percent), Freitas do Amaral (2 percent) Mota Pinto (2 percent), Alvaro Cunhal (1 percent) and Pinto Balsemao (1 percent). In addition, 7 percent of those questioned preferred "other candidates," 3 percent answered "none of them" and 19 percent had no opinion.

The name of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is particularly mentioned by the APU [United People's Alliance] voters (75 percent) and by those of the PS [Socialist Party] (52 percent). They are followed by those of the PSD [Social Democratic Party] with 19 percent and those of the CDS [Social Democratic Center Party] with 9 percent. By comparison, the highest "voting" for Nobre da Costa comes from CDS voters, 18 percent, followed by those of the PSD with 17 percent. Only 13 percent of the PS voters mentioned him and as for those of the APU, references to him were reduced to zero. Responses by APU voters, also show a great unanimity, or at least an insignificant dispersion: 75 percent, as was said, choose Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo, 9 percent choose Alvaro Cunhal and 2 percent Salgado Zenha, while 10 percent prefer "other candidates" and 4 percent have no opinion.

Of them all, the latter is the lowest of the low percentages: voters of the PS "with no opinion" totalled 12 percent, those of the CDS, 15 percent; and those of the PSD, 22 percent. With this high percentage of voters without an opinion, the PSD is also the party showing the greatest dispersion of preferences, with some references to all names. Therefore, taking into account the total references (spontaneous and prompted) we obtain the following: Pintasilgo, 19 percent; Nobre da Costa, 17 percent; Mario Soares, 3 percent; Salgado Zenha, 7 percent; Garcia dos Santos, 4 percent; Joao Jardim, 8.9 percent; Mota Amaral, 3 percent; Freitas do Amaral, 5 percent, Mota Pinto, 4 percent; Alvaro Cunhal, 1 percent; Pinto Balsemao, 1 percent; others, 8 percent and none of them, 3 percent.

For the PS voters, Mario Soares appears in second place with 14 percent, followed closely by Nobre da Costa with 13 percent. Two references are worthy of mention after that: Garcia dos Santos with 6 percent and Salgado Zenha with 5 percent. However, while the name of Mario Soares did not receive enough references among the PSD voters to exceed 3 percent, the voters of the PS paid back in the same coin and at high interest, giving zero to Mota Pinto and Pinto Balsameo, although Mota Amaral received 3 percent and Joao Jardim 2 percent.

The CDS "honored" Nobre da Costa, who garnered 18 percent of the references of the centrists and was followed by Freitas do Amaral with 17 percent. After that the most significant percentages are those of the voters who make no choice or have no opinion (15 percent in both cases) and those who mention the name or names of Garcia dos Santos (14 percent), Mota Amaral, (12 percent) and Salgado Zenha, (11 percent).

### P3 and "Eanists" Pick Soares

Taking total responses into consideration, we note that the name of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo obtains its greatest percentage in the region of Lisbon (43 percent) among women in the age group from 45 to 54 years-of-age (43 percent). Nobre da Costa, in turn, was referred to the most in the region of Porto (14 percent compared to 12 percent in the Lisbon region), among men in the age group over 55 years-of-age.

It is in the region of Porto that Mario Soares also received the greatest percentage of the total references (8 compared to 7 in the Lisbon region). By age groups, the largest percentage for the present prime minister may be found in the group 18 to 24 years-of-age (11 percent) and women voters (9 percent compared to 5 percent).

Now, analyzing only the spontaneous replies, the Marktest/O JORNAL survey gives the following total results in percentages: Lourdes Pintasilgo, 24; Mario Soares, 7; Alberto Joao Jardim, 3; Mota Amaral, 2; Freitas do Amaral, 2. Names such as those of Salgado Zenha, Pinto Balsemao, Ferrer Correia, Costa Bras, Alvaro Cunhal, Nobre da Costa and Mota Pinto have 1 percent or less. The percentage of those who did not know or did not answer was high (42 percent). It is noted that among the latter the largest percentages are from the northern region (67 percent) and the southern region (44 percent). In the region of Porto, the percentage of those who did not know or did not respond was 40 percent and 36 percent in the Lisbon region.

Also in this chapter (spontaneous answers without there having been the mention of any names), it is noted that in the Porto region and in the south the name of Maria de Lourdes Pintasilgo is mentioned the most (26 percent in both cases, compared to 25 percent in the Lisbon region and 13 percent in the northern region. As far as the previous vote of those who picked the name of Pintasilgo, it was noted that 40 percent voted for the PS, 10 percent for the PSD, 49 percent for the APU, 1 percent for the CDS and 33 percent for Eanes. [Figures as published].

The highest percentage for Mario Soares came from the southern region, 9 percent, while among those questioned in the Lisbon region it totalled 7 percent, the Porto region, 8 percent, and those of the northern region, 5 percent. With respect to the previous vote of those surveyed, they were in the majority of the PS with 14 percent, followed by those who voted for Eanes with 9 percent and the voters of the PSD with 3 percent. Strangely, the references made by APU and CDS voters were not enough to reach 1 percent, which in round numbers we have to put down as zero.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

# EANES SPEECH SEEN CASTING PRESIDENT ON LEFT

Lisbon SEMANARIO in Portuguese 15 Dec 84 p 12

[Article by Paulo Portas: "The Same Eanes"]

[Text] There were those who became excited at the radio interview with the president of the republic last Sunday. I do not know why. It is true that the answers were fluent--so what? As far as content was concerned Eanes was just like Eanism, everything in the conditional. Basically, the power of Eanes is minor and if Eanism comes it will be in installments and well ensconced within the system. Which means that the president said nothing new. He only confirmed that he has some ambitions for the future, something which in honor to truth everyone had already suspected. There was no political earthquake nor any great fright. It has been a long time since each presidential speech was a general embarrassment. The day is near in which a majority president will be an additional relative competitor in the race for a rotten and poor system.

The interview did have some interesting and clarifying details, details which were apparently inoffensive phrases. Among several, one of them particularly drew my attention. The president was rambling on about the borders between what he calls the "evolutional right" and the "moderate left." when he said this: "The differences will not be so great when it is considered that the left is, above all, the capacity to think of a more just and more equitable society, a more balanced national independence and a more deeply felt and real solidarity, which corresponds to the great Christian cultural values which mark Portuguese society." I swear that is exactly what the president said. Ipsis verbis. This means that Eanes gave an ideological description of himself and revealed the type of doctrinaire reasoning he is preparing. Without playing with words we now know that there is a Christian favoring Socialism in Belem.

With the passing of time, Eanes has already confessed to many ideological relationships. It is well to remember two facts. In the legislative elections of 1980 the president was a "silent actor" in the times of the proselytizing campaign by the socialists. After the defeat he glued himself to the winners. A month had not yet gone by and the president was already saying that he had no difficulties in agreeing with the Democratic Alliance program. From this it can be seen that ideology is no big thing for the



president and that political convictions are not a determining factor in public office, which allows not one but all imaginable practices in the name of the most diverse justices and equities, the most varied solidarities and the most diverse national independences. In short, it allows one to be a man of the left and sing paeans to private enterprise, praise the Church and criticize the state. It is well to be forewarned: The very new description of Eanes as a man of the left is very capable of having the same result as the previous ones, which means nothing good for the country.

The phrase spoken by Eanes is not very enlightened. After all the president raised the dignity of the myths of the left by making them his own. He gave in to an old phenomenon which is that of acknowledging that the left has a monopoly on the good intentions mentioned in political language. That is why the left always appeared to be for justice even while being unjust; for equity even when being inequitable; for solidarity even when being arbitrary. Times changed. Realities have left no room for doubt; with the left nations do not become rich nor do individuals advance. The left does not generate abundance and it handles crises badly. That is why to describe the left as justice, equity, solidarity and, incomprehensively, as national independence, is a clearcut deception about something which has no merit. And more, the desire of the left to take on the supplement of a soul now, is not something recent. The confusion of leftist beliefs with Christian values is even a current habit in the circles which have socialized their Christian training. However, such confusion is nothing more than the sum of different plans, a political excuse if not a form, a mere form of recruiting voters in which there is a deception in this alignment of the left with Christianity; and Eanes collaborated...

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

PARTIES SEEN GUILTY OF 1982 CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION

Lisbon EXPRESSO in Portuguese 5 Jan 85 p 3

[Article by Jose Antonio Saraiva: "The Revenge of Eanes"]

[Text] Last Tuesday the president of the republic, breaking with tradition, used the New Year's speech to make a violent criticism of the way in which the country is being governed.

The subject is not original.

Before Eanes, others had already done so: Cardinal Dom Antonio Ribeiro or General Lemos Ferreira. The conclusion to be drawn is that the chief of state has not wanted to leave to the Catholic Church or the armed forces the privilege of being the only ones to reveal the seriousness of the situation. In other words, after the hierarchy of the church and the troops said what they said, Eanes could not remain silent.

Obviously the president's speech was an easy speech.

Secluded in Belem, not having to make any decision having to do with the resolution of specific problems of the country, restricting himself to signing already-prepared decrees, to receiving people at the palace or to being present at the release of books written by friends or at official ceremonies, General Eanes finds himself in the comfortable position of being able to criticize others without running the risk of being criticized.

The question is asked, however, "Who is responsible for this situation?"  
Is it Eanes?

It must be said that the "The parties of the regime," the PS, PSD and CDS [Socialist Party, Social Democratic Party and Social Democratic Center Party], when they changed the constitution, reducing the powers of the president, committed an error which cannot be called naivete only because it was motivated by passion.

Socialists, Social Democrats and Centrists were convinced at that time that by reducing the powers of the president they were getting even with him because they were telling the Portuguese people that he was the cause of their troubles, pointing him out as being responsible for shortcomings in government.

The question was posed in a simple and direct manner: firing Soares in 1978 or vetoing the law of sectors presented by Sa Carneiro in 1980, Eanes had not allowed the parties to govern as they wanted and had hindered the solution to national problems.

What the parties did not see, or did not want to see, is that when they changed the constitution they became the only ones responsible for what happened from then on.

That was the situation Eanes took advantage of and now comes on the first day of the year to blame the Executive Branch for the situation of the country. And the problem now is that while the parties who were in government before had an alibi for governing badly, today they have none.

The error, meanwhile, has been committed and the PS, PSD and CDS have no one to blame but themselves.

The prestige rating of Gen Ramalho Eanes will probably rise even more from here on.

The appearance of the party being demanded from him probably becomes for many Portuguese even more urgent now.

It remains to be said that the "Eanista Party" was exclusively generated within the "parties of the regime."

It was not only because of the errors that they (perhaps inevitably) accumulated while governing the country, but also because of the fact that at some point--it is not known for what strange reason--they became convinced that they were capable of resolving all the problems, deciding to become solely responsible for everything that was to happen.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

EX-CNARPE OFFICIAL TERMS IT READY FOR ELECTIONS

Lisbon DIARIO DE LISBOA in Portuguese 4 Jan 85 p 5

[Excerpt] If legislative elections were held tomorrow, the CNARPE could nominate candidates throughout the country, and is ready to become a formal political party and to participate in the coming elections. This statement was made to the ANOP [Portuguese News Agency] this morning by Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos, a member of the national secretariat of the movement.

This supporter of Ramalho Eanes said that this decision was adopted at the last meeting, and he said that "the machinery is in place, such that if there were legislative elections tomorrow, the movement could submit slates of candidates throughout the country."

Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos emphasized that the new party has a profoundly innovative program which calls for the participation of all citizens, under the slogan "Renew Confidence, Organize Hope," and it urges such constitutional reforms as the need for a new electoral law which will make the deputies responsible to their electors.

Currently they are very often mere party functionaries, he stressed, adding that "the new political practice urged by the former CNARPE should contribute decisively to resolving these problems."

Moreover, in statements made to the Lisbon correspondent of the GUARDIAN, which carried an article on the 29th of last month under the headline "A New Party Seeks To Revitalize Portugal," Jose Carlos de Vasconcelos stated that the movement "wants to encourage change in Portugal, giving priority to creativity on the local level, and to establish new political relations going beyond the traditional division between right and left."

Comments by Eanes

While the president of the republic, according to a memorandum released in Belem yesterday, is contemplating the unofficial cabinet note, of which in fact he had no prior knowledge, and its content, promising to make his position public in due course, Herminio Martinho and the personnel of the CNARPE have for several days now been engaged in serious activities throughout the country, sponsoring meetings in various districts.

In some of them, the withdrawal of major figures from various parties in order to join the new movement is already public knowledge. One of the most recent instances involves the president of the Trancoso Chamber.

Events do not always have to do with each other in principle, but there is an obvious connection. Certain events lead to others and the snowball grows at the same rate as popular discontent, mainly due to the privations thousands of Portuguese citizens are experiencing.

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### JARDIM ADVOCATES ESTABLISHMENT OF FOURTH REPUBLIC

Lisbon O DIA in Portuguese 9 Jan 85 p 13

[Excerpts] Alberto Joao Jardim, head of the regional government of Madeira, is the author of an article published in yesterday's edition of JORNAL DA MADEIRA, in which he said that the "1974 military movement caused the fall of the Second Republic, with the establishment of the myth of the left as its immediate consequence."

Calling for the immediate establishment of the Fourth Republic, in view of the total failure of the Third Republic which followed the events of 25 April, Joao Jardim is pointing to the proper path which the majority of the people have already begun to demand, quietly at first, but now openly.

In fact, O DIA has very frequently commented on this desire of the people, explaining that the basically parliamentary system has always failed in Portugal. It was so under the constitutional monarchy and during the First Republic, and it all ended in a dictatorial regime with the 28 May 1926 government.

Nostalgia for the past regime, which exists in fact in many sectors, is nothing but an unwitting and desperate reaction on the part of the degraded and degrading present regime, which, as the head of the government of Madeira said, has seen the establishment of "prevailing demagoguery, of which full advantage has been taken by the Communist Party, and for its share in the attack on the state apparatus, by the Socialist Party, with the disastrous results now visible."

All quarters are cynically discussing the presidential election, knowing perfectly well that this will not resolve anything, strictly speaking. All of the politicians are talking, imitating the focus of Sa Carneiro, of "a president, a majority, a government," plainly knowing that in practice this is not possible now. If the proclaimed Eanist party takes shape, the electoral spread (or market) will be still further divided. No party will have a majority, governments will always have to be coalition governments, and the fragility of the system will become ever greater. Lack of stability and the lack of real capacity to promote the needed changes will in the end create a situation which will lead to another 28 May.

Establishing the Fourth Republic in Portugal is the least which should be done to save the country, like what General DeGaulle did in France in 1958 to save the French, with the creation of the French Fifth Republic. Then France prospered, became a respected power, and the French people themselves, within their territory, changed, because the system changed.

Charging the Socialist Party with responsibility for the "paralysis and conformism characterizing the present system," the head of the government in Madeira stated categorically that "Mario Soares is therefore not the candidate of change, of dynamism, of modernization, of liberation. Mario Soares is the guardian of the Third Republic against the innovation of the Fourth Republic.

"Therefore," Joao Jardim said, "it is not surprising that the new bourgeoisie, those people who never earned so much money or could do so so easily, support the retention of this system which has led them to prosper.

"Now the present Third Republic is the creation of the Portuguese left wing, which is today little more than a myth. It is in the national interest to force replacement of it," he emphasized. Alberto Joao Jardim added that the left wing in Portugal "has not only broken the promises it made 10 years ago or a little less, but has also become conservative, opposed to change and reactionary."

Joao Jardim wrote in that article that "it is responsible for a foreign debt such as we have never had before, accompanied by a decline in the domestic product, unprecedented unemployment, corruption and crime, and insecurity for young people and families about the future such as has never existed before."

Quoting Fernando Pessoa and Manuel Antunes to justify the statement that the Portuguese left wing is a myth, Joao Jardim ended his article by emphasizing that "it (the left wing) promised a dynamic development of the country, but the situation, one of total degradation, is precisely the opposite."

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POLITICAL

PORTUGAL

#### POLL REVEALS GENERALIZED ATTITUDE OF PESSIMISM

Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS in Portuguese 6 Jan 85 p 12

[Article by Nuno Cintra Torres: "Pessimism, Fatalism, Resignation and...a House"]

[Excerpt] The current state of mind among the citizens of Portugal is one of resignation and pessimism. When asked whether they are optimistic about the future of Portugal, 52 percent said they were pessimistic, 31 percent indifferent and 17 percent optimistic.

The most consistently pessimistic group is made up of individuals between the ages of 18 and 34, almost 60 percent of whom said they were pessimistic. But individuals in the upper classes also indicated pessimism in large numbers (65 percent), and there are more pessimists among the residents of Greater Oporto (57 percent) than in Greater Lisbon (53 percent).

More than half of the individuals (55 percent) gave the increase in living costs as the reason for their pessimism. Other groups gave a long list of reasons, almost all of them having to do with their personal or the national economic situation. Poor government was mentioned by 35 percent, while 20 percent attributed their pessimism to society itself, which is worse.

#### Latent Fatalism

The results of the poll reveal the existence of a latent fatalism as to the impossibility of changing the reasons for the pessimism. The most common reaction was the development of a desire to flee. In fact, 45 percent said that they would emigrate if they could. In Greater Lisbon, more than half said they would emigrate (51 percent), while in Greater Oporto the percentage declined to about a third (38 percent).

Naturally, it was the youngest individuals who indicated the greatest willingness to emigrate, with 68 percent as compared to 28 percent in the age group above 55. This readiness can be explained in terms of age, as the concept of lack of prospects for the future will also reveal.

The nations preferred by those who would emigrate are the United States of America (20 percent), Switzerland and France (13 percent), the FRG (12 percent), Brazil (6 percent) and South Africa (5 percent).

Fatalism was revealed in particular by the answers to the questions as to whether those interviewed believed that Portugal might cease to be one of the poorest countries in Europe or not. The number who believe that Portugal could become a rich country (47 percent) was very near the number of those who do not believe it could (43 percent).

The results seem to suggest that resignation is more widespread in Greater Oporto than in Greater Lisbon. In the North, although there are more pessimists than in the South, there are on the other hand fewer persons who believe that Portugal could become richer in the future, and fewer individuals who are thinking of emigrating. This seems to indicate that these individuals view their situation pessimistically, but with resignation as well.

#### After Joining the EEC, the Future of Portugal Will:

Worsen	26
Improve	25
Remain the same	13
No answer	35

#### Views on the EEC

It is not the EEC which can provide a better future, a good proportion of Portuguese citizens think. In fact, the expectations concerning the EEC are frankly discouraging. Despite a greater number of answers to questions concerning the EEC than a few years ago (now only 36 percent do not respond), the number of individuals who have come to have an opinion seems to have swelled the ranks of those who have no hope that the EEC will provide a better future for Portugal.

The groups are equally divided: 25 percent believe that Portugal's future will improve, while 26 percent believe it will worsen. Perhaps it is the group which said that things will remain the same which is right. Here it is the young people who indicate the greatest faith in the EEC. In the view of 36 percent of them, Portugal will improve.

#### Farming, Tourism and Denationalization

The public has some ideas about what the priority economic activities should be if Portugal is to become a rich country. The largest number, 30 percent, believe that agriculture must be developed, while 18 percent say tourism, 16 percent textiles, and 11 percent electronics.

The concepts pertaining to domestic priorities seem to be more balanced in Greater Oporto than in Greater Lisbon. And if we compare the cities of Oporto and Lisbon proper, we see that only 16 percent urge agriculture as the priority in Oporto, as compared to 42 percent in Lisbon. Can it be that there is greater hunger in Lisbon than in Oporto, where there is still urban-rural integration, or is this a much sharper reflection of a society which until a short time ago was predominantly agricultural?

## Democracy, But Authority Too

Earlier polls had shown that the Portuguese to continue to live in a democracy. In this once again. Only 3 percent believe that if in the future, democracy must end. And only political parties for the pessimism with 15 percent said that a single person would Portugal to be a great country in the future. Generally indicated a desire for greater authority. Those polled, a strong government is necessary. Authority for the president of the republic must be stronger. The choice seems to be for well.

## Pessimism, Government and Society

The results of the poll suggest that for many opinion, those in power are a part of some unrelated to all the rest, on which everything who are generally bad, but from whom everything

The government even appears to be unrelated up. And it emerges, naturally, as the greatest the pessimism of Portuguese citizens: 57 percent their pessimism and 36 percent say that the 1.4 percent place the responsibility with the

## In Relation to the Future of

Pessimistic  
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On the other hand, there also seems to be a Portuguese citizens in general that society 31 percent said that the blame for the pessimism with society itself, while 35 percent blame people. It should be noted on this last question put blame for the existence of poor people

There are those who regard these results, as evidence of a collective concept of blame. They lead to an effort to find solutions. They put the blame on the government.

Other analysts believe that they see the word those questioned as meaning the citizenry as a system, i.e., the government, such that the may mean the same thing. In this instance, they mean by society, giving it another meaning.



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1. The first part of the document is a letter from the President of the United States to the Congress, dated January 11, 1862.

2. The second part is a report from the Secretary of the Treasury, dated January 11, 1862.

3. The third part is a report from the Secretary of the Interior, dated January 11, 1862.

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1. Introduction

2. Objectives

3. Methodology

4. Results and Discussion

5. Conclusion

6. References

7. Appendix

8. Glossary

9. Bibliography

10. Index

11. Summary

12. Acknowledgments

13. Notes

14. Figures

15. Tables





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
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5. (a) Mr. J. H. Smith, 12, The Green, London, N.W. 1.  
6. (b) Mrs. A. B. Jones, 45, The Lane, London, N.W. 2.  
7. (c) Mr. C. D. Brown, 78, The Road, London, N.W. 3.  
8. (d) Miss E. F. White, 23, The Street, London, N.W. 4.  
9. (e) Mr. G. H. Black, 56, The Avenue, London, N.W. 5.  
10. (f) Mrs. I. J. Grey, 89, The Close, London, N.W. 6.  
11. (g) Mr. K. L. Green, 34, The Terrace, London, N.W. 7.  
12. (h) Miss M. N. Brown, 67, The Park, London, N.W. 8.  
13. (i) Mr. O. P. White, 90, The Hill, London, N.W. 9.  
14. (j) Mrs. Q. R. Black, 12, The Square, London, N.W. 10.  
15. (k) Mr. S. T. Grey, 45, The Circle, London, N.W. 11.  
16. (l) Miss U. V. White, 78, The Crescent, London, N.W. 12.  
17. (m) Mr. W. X. Black, 23, The Arch, London, N.W. 13.  
18. (n) Mrs. Y. Z. Grey, 56, The Walk, London, N.W. 14.  
19. (o) Mr. A. B. White, 89, The Court, London, N.W. 15.  
20. (p) Miss C. D. Black, 34, The Mews, London, N.W. 16.  
21. (q) Mr. E. F. Grey, 67, The Cottage, London, N.W. 17.  
22. (r) Mrs. G. H. White, 90, The Farm, London, N.W. 18.  
23. (s) Mr. I. J. Black, 12, The House, London, N.W. 19.  
24. (t) Miss K. L. Grey, 45, The Barn, London, N.W. 20.  
25. (u) Mr. M. N. White, 78, The Shop, London, N.W. 21.  
26. (v) Mrs. O. P. Black, 23, The Office, London, N.W. 22.  
27. (w) Mr. Q. R. Grey, 56, The Garage, London, N.W. 23.  
28. (x) Miss S. T. White, 89, The Workshop, London, N.W. 24.  
29. (y) Mr. U. V. Black, 34, The Store, London, N.W. 25.  
30. (z) Mrs. W. X. Grey, 67, The Yard, London, N.W. 26.  
31. (aa) Mr. Y. Z. White, 90, The Gate, London, N.W. 27.  
32. (ab) Miss A. B. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 28.  
33. (ac) Mr. C. D. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 29.  
34. (ad) Mrs. E. F. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 30.  
35. (ae) Mr. G. H. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 31.  
36. (af) Miss I. J. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 32.  
37. (ag) Mr. K. L. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 33.  
38. (ah) Mrs. M. N. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 34.  
39. (ai) Mr. O. P. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 35.  
40. (aj) Miss Q. R. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 36.  
41. (ak) Mr. S. T. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 37.  
42. (al) Mrs. U. V. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 38.  
43. (am) Mr. W. X. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 39.  
44. (an) Miss Y. Z. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 40.  
45. (ao) Mr. A. B. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 41.  
46. (ap) Mrs. C. D. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 42.  
47. (aq) Mr. E. F. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 43.  
48. (ar) Miss G. H. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 44.  
49. (as) Mr. I. J. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 45.  
50. (at) Mrs. K. L. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 46.  
51. (au) Mr. M. N. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 47.  
52. (av) Miss O. P. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 48.  
53. (aw) Mr. Q. R. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 49.  
54. (ax) Mrs. S. T. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 50.  
55. (ay) Mr. U. V. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 51.  
56. (az) Miss W. X. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 52.  
57. (ba) Mr. Y. Z. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 53.  
58. (bb) Mrs. A. B. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 54.  
59. (bc) Mr. C. D. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 55.  
60. (bd) Miss E. F. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 56.  
61. (be) Mr. G. H. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 57.  
62. (bf) Mrs. I. J. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 58.  
63. (bg) Mr. K. L. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 59.  
64. (bh) Miss M. N. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 60.  
65. (bi) Mr. O. P. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 61.  
66. (bj) Mrs. Q. R. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 62.  
67. (bk) Mr. S. T. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 63.  
68. (bl) Miss U. V. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 64.  
69. (bm) Mr. W. X. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 65.  
70. (bn) Mrs. Y. Z. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 66.  
71. (bo) Mr. A. B. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 67.  
72. (bp) Miss C. D. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 68.  
73. (bq) Mr. E. F. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 69.  
74. (br) Mrs. G. H. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 70.  
75. (bs) Mr. I. J. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 71.  
76. (bt) Miss K. L. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 72.  
77. (bu) Mr. M. N. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 73.  
78. (bv) Mrs. O. P. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 74.  
79. (bw) Mr. Q. R. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 75.  
80. (bx) Miss S. T. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 76.  
81. (by) Mr. U. V. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 77.  
82. (bz) Mrs. W. X. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 78.  
83. (ca) Mr. Y. Z. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 79.  
84. (cb) Miss A. B. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 80.  
85. (cc) Mr. C. D. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 81.  
86. (cd) Mrs. E. F. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 82.  
87. (ce) Mr. G. H. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 83.  
88. (cf) Miss I. J. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 84.  
89. (cg) Mr. K. L. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 85.  
90. (ch) Mrs. M. N. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 86.  
91. (ci) Mr. O. P. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 87.  
92. (cj) Miss Q. R. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 88.  
93. (ck) Mr. S. T. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 89.  
94. (cl) Mrs. U. V. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 90.  
95. (cm) Mr. W. X. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 91.  
96. (cn) Miss Y. Z. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 92.  
97. (co) Mr. A. B. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 93.  
98. (cp) Mrs. C. D. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 94.  
99. (cq) Mr. E. F. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 95.  
100. (cr) Miss G. H. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 96.  
101. (cs) Mr. I. J. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 97.  
102. (ct) Mrs. K. L. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 98.  
103. (cu) Mr. M. N. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 99.  
104. (cv) Miss O. P. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 100.  
105. (cw) Mr. Q. R. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 101.  
106. (cx) Mrs. S. T. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 102.  
107. (cy) Mr. U. V. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 103.  
108. (cz) Miss W. X. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 104.  
109. (da) Mr. Y. Z. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 105.  
110. (db) Mrs. A. B. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 106.  
111. (dc) Mr. C. D. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 107.  
112. (dd) Miss E. F. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 108.  
113. (de) Mr. G. H. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 109.  
114. (df) Mrs. I. J. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 110.  
115. (dg) Mr. K. L. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 111.  
116. (dh) Miss M. N. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 112.  
117. (di) Mr. O. P. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 113.  
118. (dj) Mrs. Q. R. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 114.  
119. (dk) Mr. S. T. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 115.  
120. (dl) Miss U. V. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 116.  
121. (dm) Mr. W. X. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 117.  
122. (dn) Mrs. Y. Z. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 118.  
123. (do) Mr. A. B. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 119.  
124. (dp) Miss C. D. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 120.  
125. (dq) Mr. E. F. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 121.  
126. (dr) Mrs. G. H. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 122.  
127. (ds) Mr. I. J. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 123.  
128. (dt) Miss K. L. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 124.  
129. (du) Mr. M. N. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 125.  
130. (dv) Mrs. O. P. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 126.  
131. (dw) Mr. Q. R. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 127.  
132. (dx) Miss S. T. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 128.  
133. (dy) Mr. U. V. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 129.  
134. (dz) Mrs. W. X. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 130.  
135. (ea) Mr. Y. Z. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 131.  
136. (eb) Miss A. B. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 132.  
137. (ec) Mr. C. D. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 133.  
138. (ed) Mrs. E. F. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 134.  
139. (ee) Mr. G. H. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 135.  
140. (ef) Miss I. J. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 136.  
141. (eg) Mr. K. L. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 137.  
142. (eh) Mrs. M. N. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 138.  
143. (ei) Mr. O. P. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 139.  
144. (ej) Miss Q. R. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 140.  
145. (ek) Mr. S. T. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 141.  
146. (el) Mrs. U. V. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 142.  
147. (em) Mr. W. X. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 143.  
148. (en) Miss Y. Z. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 144.  
149. (eo) Mr. A. B. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 145.  
150. (ep) Mrs. C. D. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 146.  
151. (eq) Mr. E. F. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 147.  
152. (er) Miss G. H. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 148.  
153. (es) Mr. I. J. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 149.  
154. (et) Mrs. K. L. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 150.  
155. (eu) Mr. M. N. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 151.  
156. (ev) Miss O. P. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 152.  
157. (ew) Mr. Q. R. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 153.  
158. (ex) Mrs. S. T. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 154.  
159. (ey) Mr. U. V. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 155.  
160. (ez) Mrs. W. X. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 156.  
161. (fa) Mr. Y. Z. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 157.  
162. (fb) Miss A. B. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 158.  
163. (fc) Mr. C. D. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 159.  
164. (fd) Mrs. E. F. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 160.  
165. (fe) Mr. G. H. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 161.  
166. (ff) Miss I. J. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 162.  
167. (fg) Mr. K. L. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 163.  
168. (fh) Mrs. M. N. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 164.  
169. (fi) Mr. O. P. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 165.  
170. (fj) Miss Q. R. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 166.  
171. (fk) Mr. S. T. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 167.  
172. (fl) Mrs. U. V. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 168.  
173. (fm) Mr. W. X. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 169.  
174. (fn) Miss Y. Z. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 170.  
175. (fo) Mr. A. B. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 171.  
176. (fp) Mrs. C. D. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 172.  
177. (fq) Mr. E. F. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 173.  
178. (fr) Miss G. H. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 174.  
179. (fs) Mr. I. J. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 175.  
180. (ft) Mrs. K. L. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 176.  
181. (fu) Mr. M. N. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 177.  
182. (fv) Miss O. P. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 178.  
183. (fw) Mr. Q. R. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 179.  
184. (fx) Mrs. S. T. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 180.  
185. (fy) Mr. U. V. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 181.  
186. (fz) Miss W. X. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 182.  
187. (ga) Mr. Y. Z. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 183.  
188. (gb) Mrs. A. B. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 184.  
189. (gc) Mr. C. D. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 185.  
190. (gd) Miss E. F. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 186.  
191. (ge) Mr. G. H. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 187.  
192. (gf) Mrs. I. J. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 188.  
193. (gg) Mr. K. L. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 189.  
194. (gh) Miss M. N. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 190.  
195. (gi) Mr. O. P. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 191.  
196. (gj) Mrs. Q. R. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 192.  
197. (gk) Mr. S. T. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 193.  
198. (gl) Miss U. V. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 194.  
199. (gm) Mr. W. X. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 195.  
200. (gn) Mrs. Y. Z. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 196.  
201. (go) Mr. A. B. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 197.  
202. (gp) Miss C. D. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 198.  
203. (gq) Mr. E. F. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 199.  
204. (gr) Mrs. G. H. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 200.  
205. (gs) Mr. I. J. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 201.  
206. (gt) Miss K. L. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 202.  
207. (gu) Mr. M. N. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 203.  
208. (gv) Mrs. O. P. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 204.  
209. (gw) Mr. Q. R. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 205.  
210. (gx) Miss S. T. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 206.  
211. (gy) Mr. U. V. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 207.  
212. (gz) Mrs. W. X. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 208.  
213. (ha) Mr. Y. Z. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 209.  
214. (hb) Miss A. B. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 210.  
215. (hc) Mr. C. D. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 211.  
216. (hd) Mrs. E. F. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 212.  
217. (he) Mr. G. H. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 213.  
218. (hf) Miss I. J. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 214.  
219. (hg) Mr. K. L. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 215.  
220. (hh) Mrs. M. N. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 216.  
221. (hi) Mr. O. P. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 217.  
222. (hj) Miss Q. R. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 218.  
223. (hk) Mr. S. T. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 219.  
224. (hl) Mrs. U. V. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 220.  
225. (hm) Mr. W. X. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 221.  
226. (hn) Miss Y. Z. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 222.  
227. (ho) Mr. A. B. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 223.  
228. (hp) Mrs. C. D. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 224.  
229. (hq) Mr. E. F. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 225.  
230. (hr) Miss G. H. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 226.  
231. (hs) Mr. I. J. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 227.  
232. (ht) Mrs. K. L. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 228.  
233. (hu) Mr. M. N. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 229.  
234. (hv) Miss O. P. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 230.  
235. (hw) Mr. Q. R. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 231.  
236. (hx) Mrs. S. T. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 232.  
237. (hy) Mr. U. V. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 233.  
238. (hz) Mrs. W. X. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 234.  
239. (ia) Mr. Y. Z. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 235.  
240. (ib) Miss A. B. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 236.  
241. (ic) Mr. C. D. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 237.  
242. (id) Mrs. E. F. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 238.  
243. (ie) Mr. G. H. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 239.  
244. (if) Miss I. J. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 240.  
245. (ig) Mr. K. L. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 241.  
246. (ih) Mrs. M. N. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 242.  
247. (ii) Mr. O. P. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 243.  
248. (ij) Miss Q. R. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 244.  
249. (ik) Mr. S. T. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 245.  
250. (il) Mrs. U. V. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 246.  
251. (im) Mr. W. X. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 247.  
252. (in) Miss Y. Z. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 248.  
253. (io) Mr. A. B. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 249.  
254. (ip) Mrs. C. D. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 250.  
255. (iq) Mr. E. F. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 251.  
256. (ir) Miss G. H. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 252.  
257. (is) Mr. I. J. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 253.  
258. (it) Mrs. K. L. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 254.  
259. (iu) Mr. M. N. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 255.  
260. (iv) Miss O. P. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 256.  
261. (iu) Mr. Q. R. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 257.  
262. (iv) Mrs. S. T. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 258.  
263. (iu) Mr. U. V. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 259.  
264. (iv) Miss W. X. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 260.  
265. (iu) Mr. Y. Z. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 261.  
266. (iv) Mrs. A. B. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 262.  
267. (iu) Mr. C. D. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 263.  
268. (iv) Miss E. F. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 264.  
269. (iu) Mr. G. H. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 265.  
270. (iv) Mrs. I. J. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 266.  
271. (iu) Mr. K. L. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 267.  
272. (iv) Miss M. N. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 268.  
273. (iu) Mr. O. P. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 269.  
274. (iv) Mrs. Q. R. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 270.  
275. (iu) Mr. S. T. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 271.  
276. (iv) Miss U. V. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 272.  
277. (iu) Mr. W. X. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 273.  
278. (iv) Mrs. Y. Z. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 274.  
279. (iu) Mr. A. B. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 275.  
280. (iv) Miss C. D. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 276.  
281. (iu) Mr. E. F. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 277.  
282. (iv) Mrs. G. H. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 278.  
283. (iu) Mr. I. J. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 279.  
284. (iv) Miss K. L. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 280.  
285. (iu) Mr. M. N. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 281.  
286. (iv) Mrs. O. P. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 282.  
287. (iu) Mr. Q. R. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 283.  
288. (iv) Miss S. T. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 284.  
289. (iu) Mr. U. V. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 285.  
290. (iv) Mrs. W. X. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 286.  
291. (iu) Mr. Y. Z. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 287.  
292. (iv) Miss A. B. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 288.  
293. (iu) Mr. C. D. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 289.  
294. (iv) Mrs. E. F. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 290.  
295. (iu) Mr. G. H. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 291.  
296. (iv) Miss I. J. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 292.  
297. (iu) Mr. K. L. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 293.  
298. (iv) Mrs. M. N. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 294.  
299. (iu) Mr. O. P. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 295.  
300. (iv) Miss Q. R. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 296.  
301. (iu) Mr. S. T. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 297.  
302. (iv) Mrs. U. V. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 298.  
303. (iu) Mr. W. X. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 299.  
304. (iv) Miss Y. Z. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 300.  
305. (iu) Mr. A. B. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 301.  
306. (iv) Mrs. C. D. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 302.  
307. (iu) Mr. E. F. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 303.  
308. (iv) Miss G. H. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 304.  
309. (iu) Mr. I. J. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 305.  
310. (iv) Mrs. K. L. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 306.  
311. (iu) Mr. M. N. Black, 23, The Wall, London, N.W. 307.  
312. (iv) Miss O. P. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 308.  
313. (iu) Mr. Q. R. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 309.  
314. (iv) Mrs. S. T. Black, 12, The Wall, London, N.W. 310.  
315. (iu) Mr. U. V. Grey, 45, The Post, London, N.W. 311.  
316. (iv) Mrs. W. X. White, 78, The Gate, London, N.W. 312.  
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372. (iv) Mrs. E. F. Grey, 56, The Post, London, N.W. 368.  
373. (iu) Mr. G. H. White, 89, The Gate, London, N.W. 369.  
374. (iv) Miss I. J. Black,

January 1961 (see below)

1961-1962 (see below)

1962-1963 (see below)

1963-1964 (see below)

1964-1965 (see below)

1965-1966 (see below)

1966-1967 (see below)

1967-1968 (see below)

1968-1969 (see below)



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
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1. The first part of the report is a summary of the work done during the last year. It is a very brief summary, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

2. The second part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

3. The third part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

4. The fourth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

5. The fifth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

6. The sixth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

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11. The eleventh part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

12. The twelfth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

13. The thirteenth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

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15. The fifteenth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

16. The sixteenth part of the report is a list of the work done during the last year. It is a very long list, but it gives a good idea of the work done.

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1. General

When the first indication of a problem is observed, the following steps should be taken to identify the cause and correct the problem. The first step is to determine the location of the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem.

The second step is to determine the nature of the problem. This can be done by asking the person who reported the problem for more details. The third step is to determine the cause of the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem.

The fourth step is to determine the effect of the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem. The fifth step is to determine the solution to the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem.

The sixth step is to determine the time of the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem. The seventh step is to determine the person who reported the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem.

The eighth step is to determine the date of the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem. The ninth step is to determine the time of the problem. This can be done by checking the location of the problem on the map or by asking the person who reported the problem.

10. Conclusion

11. Conclusion

12. Conclusion

13. Conclusion

14. Conclusion

15. Conclusion

16. Conclusion

17. Conclusion

The image shows a dark, vertical, textured surface, likely the cover or endpaper of an old book. The material appears to be a dark, possibly black or very dark brown, with a grainy texture. There are numerous small, light-colored specks and fibers visible throughout the material, suggesting age and wear. A faint, vertical line runs down the center of the image, possibly a crease or a seam. The overall appearance is that of a well-used, aged object.

C. A. KALIN, GRADUATE IN SCIENCE OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO

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the reception of the Minister of Agriculture.

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 (33) Josip Broz Tito (Yugoslavia),  
 (34) Risto Ristić (Finland)

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